Monthly Archive

Columbia Tenn
Dec 28th 1864

Dear Sister,

I received a long letter from you today. I reply not because there is anything of importance transpiring just at present, but because when the most happens is the time I am entirely unable to write. Since I was last at Columbia we have had some stirring times. Hood drove us back to Nashville. We had a very severe battle at Franklin during which our Regiment lost in killed wounded & captured some thing over half its men. After that we were in the big fight at Nashville & our company lost its Commanding Officer, a fine man who was shot through the breast & had an arm broken by a musket ball. But the success atoned for all the loss & more. Hood has halted at Columbia again. The rest of the Army has gone down after Hood. How long we shall remain here idle I know not but presume we shall have plenty to do. Sherman has taken Savannah & Hardee has escaped with his 15,000 men & will probably reinforce Hood which will give him a chance to show us considerable fight. But we shall conquer in the end. The right will triumph in the end. Charleston will be taken next and all important Sea ports. Christmas is over & I thought often of the fine times you were having at home. We had rather hard times living on hard tack & sow belly. It is quite cold to night, I have just had an argument on Slavery with the Captain who is for allowing the slaveholders credit for honesty on account of early education and I am not. I would just as — take a horse or hoe from one of these men as not. But I must stop writing. Having passed safely through the Battle of Franklin I expect good times for a while. Let me know if any thing new happening and you hear from Thomas.
Goodbye.
Your Bro. A.M.Weston

Asa M. Weston enlisted on 8/11/62 as Sergeant in Company K, 50th Ohio Infantry. He survived the Civil War.

The fiercest fighting during the battle of Franklin (November 30, 1864) centered around the home of Fountain Branch Carter (see above), looking East. Hundreds of wounded and dead could be seen from the porch after the battle. Many of those - Confederate soldiers - would eventually be interred at McGavock cemetery close by.

The CWG recommends visiting this web site: Virtual Antietam.

CWG: How many soldiers fought during the Civil War?

KM: 3.8 million men (and many boys) fought during the Civil War, from 1861 - 1865.

CWG: How many fought for the Union?

KM: 2.8 million fought to preserve the Union, roughly 13% of the total Northern population.

CWG: How many fought for the South?

KM: Just over 1 million fought for the Confederacy. Considering there were around 5 million non-blacks in the South in 1860, that accounts for roughly 20% of the total Southern (non-black) population.

CWG: How common was it to be wounded in the Civil War?

KM: For every 1,000 Federals (roughly the size of a Regiment at the beginning of the war), 112 were wounded. That number was higher for Confederates; 150 of every 1,000 Confederates were wounded.

CWG: Did battle wounds kill more soldiers or disease?

KM: Disease was much more deadly overall. While a Union soldier stood a 1 in 18 chance of dying in battle, he stood a 1 in 8 chance of dying of disease. Johnny Reb stood a 1 in 5 chance of dying of disease and a 1 in 8 chance of dying in combat.

CWG: how was the North and South, respectively ready for the casualties they faced inthe Civil War?

KM: Neither side was ready. The entire U.S. Army only had about 16,000 regular soldiers before the Civil War broke out, and most of those were out West. In April 1862 at the battle of Shiloh we see the first real staggering casualty numbers of the war. In just two days the Union lost over 10,000 men (killed or wounded) and the Confederates lost 9,700. That’s nearly 20,000 men in one battle.

CWG: this must have put an incredible strain on the ability to care for the wounded and dying.

KM: These kind of casualty numbers caused an enormous strain on the medical care required for the soldiers. When the War broke out there were just 113 surgeons in the U.S. Army, by the end there would be 12,000 in the Union ranks, and an additional 3,200 in the Confederate Army. Many men no doubt expired on the field having simply bled to death before proper care could be administered.

CWG: did medical care improve much as the war continued?

KM: Care for the wounded improved greatly as the War drew on. Mortality rates for surgeries especially improved as doctors improved their understanding of the body, disease, and the application of medical procedures.

Interview with Professor Steven E. Woodworth
12/27/2006

Recommended reading for this interview?

• Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Woodworth
• The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, Sword
• For Cause & For Country, Jacobson

Subject: John Bell Hood’s Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns (1864)

Also: read the interview with Dr. Woodworth about troop unit sizes during the Civil War

CWG: it’s pretty popular to bash Hood. There seems to be a strong Hood-hater crowd. Your thoughts?

SW: I think Hood has received something less than a fair shake from the historians, especially from those like Sword. For balance, read Steve Davis’s Atlanta Will Fall.

CWG: how important is the background to the Atlanta campaign important in understanding Hood’s involvement in it, assuming command late in that campaign?

SW: The fate of Atlanta was, from a Confederate point of view, all but decided by Joe Johnston. Given that a Union army of approximately 100,000 men, of the degree of toughness and experience it possessed, commanded by a general of Sherman’s skill and resolution, was advancing toward Atlanta, it’s fall was probably certain by the time the Federals crossed the Chattahoochee. Hood was given a hopeless assignment.

CWG: So what do you do when you’re assigned to do the impossible but you are expected to make a serious attempt at it?

SW: Well, in the case of Hood at Atlanta, you can’t retreat, since any further retreat will give up the city at once. When an opposing army executes a turning maneuver (which any Civil War army could do to any other at any time–even Burnside did it to Lee) the army that is turned must either retreat or attack. (In the case of Burnside and Lee, Burnside was stalled by the absence of the pontoons so as to negate his turning maneuver and relieve Lee of the necessity either of retreating or of attacking.) Sherman was almost unequaled in his propensity and skill for turning maneuvers. When Sherman turned him, Hood could not retreat, and so had to attack. His plans were reasonably skillful, though making good plans is probably the least difficult of a commanding general’s duties.

CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Peachtree on July 20th, where Hood lost nearly 5,000 men?

SW: At Peachtree Creek he failed due to 1) his own physical inability to oversee the maneuver, 2) lack of adequate staff work (endemic to Confederate armies), and 3) Hardee’s apparent lack of cordial cooperation. Of course, the Confederates had at best an infinitessimally small margin of error at Peachtree Creek given who they were fighting against (Thomas)

CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Atlanta on July 22, where Hood lost 8,500 men?

SW: At the Battle of Atlanta Hood and his men did absolutely everything that should have been necessary to win a victory. Had they executed an attack like that one on Hooker and the Army of the Potomac at the time of Chancellorsville, I believe they would have won a victory at least as impressive. On the other hand, if Lee and Jackson and the Army of Northern Virginia could somehow have been transported through time and space to attack McPherson and Logan and the Army of the Tennessee at Atlanta, I believe the Federals would still have prevailed. The Army of the Tennessee was simply stout enough to withstand any blow the Confederates could conceivably have dealt, barring the presence of overwhelming Confederate numbers.

CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Ezra Church July 28 where 3,000 Confederate casualties took place?

SW: Ezra Church was of course an unmitigated flop–a complete fiasco from a Confederate point of view. It is attributable to a gross blunder by Stephen D. Lee and of course also to Hood’s own inability to oversee events personally and, perhaps, as well, to his lack of attention to detail.

CWG: and Jonesborough August 31st - Sept 1st?

SW: Jonesboro was much the same, as Ezra Church, in overall concept.

CWG: So your overall assessment og Hood in Atlanta would be?

SW: Therefore, my assessment of Hood’s performance in the Atlanta campaign is that he was 1) physically incapacitated by wounds from exercising fully effective command of a Confederate field army, and 2) possibly somewhat careless of details, as Lee had suggested.

CWG: let’s turn to Hood’s Tennessee campaign. Set the background up for us and place Hood in the reality he was facing.

SW: The Tennessee campaign is the same thing only more. What is a Confederate commander to do, in November 1864? Suppose you’re a Confederate army commander at that time. You’ve got to try something that at least seems to have a remote chance of saving the cause. What do you do? it’s hard to think of any course of action that could have won it for the Confederacy at that point. Would Jefferson Davis and Confederate public opinion have tolerated a passive policy of simply sitting down in front of Atlanta, poised to hinder Sherman’s advance farther into the interior of Georgia? Would they have insisted that Hood attempt to retake Atlanta?

CWG: Would the North Georgia policy, if pursued persistently, have yielded better results in the long run?

SW: Well, it would have piled up fewer casualties, but the end result would have been Union victory anyway. I’d say the worst criticism to which Hood is liable for the Tennessee campaign is that he acted out of desperation and failed about as spectacularly as is possible to imagine.

CWG: what responsibility should we lay at the feet of the Confederate political authorities?

SW: Maybe we should blame the Confederate political authorities for keeping their military fighting, throwing away lives by the thousand in utterly desperate gambits, when all rational hope of victory was past.

CWG: what significance or role did Franklin/Nashville have in the overall war effort for the South (for late 1864)?

SW: Franklin and Nashville had a limited impact on the overall course of the war simply because they failed to change anything. The Union controlled Tennessee before the campaign and controlled it even more solidly afterward. Confederate chances for success in the campaign were, from the outset, rather desperate. The impact of the battles was 1) to increase the overall Confederate death toll of the war, and 2) to remove whatever latent threat to Union control of Tennessee might have been posed by Hood’s army lurking in north Alabama. For example, it seems unlikely that Schofield’s two corps would have been shifted to the east coast if Hood, with an as yet unbroken Army of Tennessee, were still lurking just outside the state, threatening to move north.

And yet, would that have changed the outcome of the war? No, Sherman could have accomplished his purpose without Schofield, and the overall outcome would have been the same. Perhaps the crowning irony of the battles of Franklin and Nashville is that they were fought at a time when the war was already decided. by late November 1864 it is difficult to imagine any train of events that could have led to a Confederate victory.

Important quotes related to the Battle of Franklin:

When we got to the turnpike near Spring Hill, lo! and behold; wonder of wonders! the whole Yankee army had passed during the night. The bird had flown.

- Confederate Private Sam Watkins, 1st Tennessee Infantry

[Hood was] wrathy as a rattlesnake this morning, striking at everything.

- Confederate General John Brown to Maj. Vaulx of Cheatham’s staff, on the disposition of John Bell Hood on the morning of November 30th, upon learning that the Federals had escaped from Spring Hill in the early morning hours and had headed toward Franklin.

I have never seen more intense rage and profound disgust than was expressed by the weary, foot-sore, battle-torn Confederate soldiers when they discovered that their officers had allowed their prey to escape.

- Mississippian Rhett Thomas

The road was strewn everywhere with the wreck of thrown away stuff that they were unable to carry in their flight.

- Confederate Lt. Spencer B. Talley, 28th TN Infantry, describing what he saw along the Columbia Pike as the rebel army followed after the Union army into Franklin

To which Lt. William H. Berryhill, 43rd Miss., (CSA) added, the road was strewn with tents, knapsacks, dirty clothing, books, paper and a great many wagons were on fire.

Burnt wagons, dead pack animals, and tossed knapsacks all seemed to indicate a demoralized retreat, heartening the Southerners with thoughts of possible enemy capitulation and a quick victory.

Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.

If you prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much.

- George H. Thomas (c0mmander), to John M. Schofield, regarding how to proceed if an attack was to ensue at Franklin. Contrast this with Hood’s attack at-any-cost approach at Franklin.

I do no think the Federals will stand strong pressure from the front; the show of force they are making is a feint in order to hold me back from a more vigorous pursuit.

- General John Bell Hood to Nathan Bedford Forrest

General Hood, if you give me one strong division of infantry with my cavalry, I will agree to flank the Federals from their works within two hours’ time.

- Nathan Bedford Forrest to his commander Hood. Hood engaged two Corps at Franklin; Stewart’s and Cheathams. He did not even wait for Lee’s Corps or for his artillery to effectively engage in the enusing battle. Had he waited for Lee, he would have had three more divisions and could have supported Forrest in his request.

We will make the fight.

- General John Bell Hood to a subordinate officer after surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, just shortly before the battle began.

I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him in the Big Harpeth river at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road.

- Confederate commander of the Army of Tennessee, General John Bell Hood, quoted from Hood’s memoirs, written long after the battle.

I could easily see all the movements of the Federals and readily trace their line. I saw that they were well fortified and in a strong position. I felt that we would take a desperate chance if we attempted to dislodge them.

- Corps Commander, Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham, upon surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, two miles south of the Fedederal’s position in downtown Franklin.

If an assault was to be made by Hood, General Cleburne said it would be a terrible and useless waste of life.

- General Patrick R. Cleburne, Cheatham’s division, who would soon lose is own life during the assault.

General, I will take the works or fall in the effort.

- Patrick Cleburne to General John Bell Hood. leburne would fall, mortally wounded in attempting to take the works.

It was the grandest sight I ever saw when our army marched over the hill and reached the open field base. Each division unfolded itself into a single line of battle with as much steadiness as if forming for dress parade. . . The men wer etired, hungry, footsore, ragged, and many of them barefooted, but their spirit was admirable.

- James D. Porter, who served on Benjamin F. Cheatham’s staff.

The rebels had filled the plain to the south, sounding to all like “a tornado heralded by clouds of darkness and muttering thunders.”

I.G. Bennett and William M. Haigh, History of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, 1876, page 644; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.

General Cleburne seemed to be more despondent than I ever saw him. Iwas the last one to receive any instructions from him, and as I saluted and bade him good-bye I remarked, ‘Well General, there will not be many of us that will get back to Arkansas,’ to which he replied, “Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men.”

- Brigadier Daniel C. Govan to Cleburne, and Cleburne’s reply upon commenting just moments before the assault was ordered by Hood.

[Pick back up at page 270 in Jacobson]

We could see them [Confederate Generals on the field at a distance] casting doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the dept of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all.

- An unknown Confederate soldier; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 37.

A profound silence pervaded the entire army; it was simply awful, reminding one of those sickening lulls which precede a tremendous thunderstorm.

- Confederate, John M. Copley, A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin, p. 48.

Go back, and tell them to fight like hell.

- Union General George Wagner instructing the courier to return to Wagner’s men on the frontline, who would take the initial blunt from Hood’s assault.

A tremendous deluge of shot and shell . . . seconded by a murderous sheet of fire and lead from the infantry behind the works, and also another battery of six guns directly in our front. It was, he said, a scene of carnage and destruction fearful to behold.

- A Mississippian survivor who faced the withering fire from Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank at the opening of the battle.

Great God! Do I command cowards?

- Confederate General William Loring, as he witnessed scores of his Mississippians running for their lives back toward the pike, after facing the initial onslaught of the fire from Casement’s and Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank.

Never before did a command of the approximate strength of Casement’s in as short a period of time kill and wound as many.

- Union soldier, B.F. Thompson, 112th Illinois, in History; p. 277. Casement’s brigade was made up of 65th and 124th Indian, and the 65th Illinois.

Dam*ed Rebel sons of b_____es . . . . stand here like rocks, and whip the h___ out of them.

- John S. Casement, Union commander of the 2nd brigade

Regarding the violent clash between Opdycke’s men and pockets of Cleburne’s and Brown’s one survivor described the action as the contending elements of hell turned loose (so indelibly stamped that a) long life spent in peaceful pursuits will not suffice to erase or even dim them.

- A survivor of the 73rd Illinois regiment.

With no place to go and no place to hide, the Confederates mounted desperate attacks across the parapet - “as many as thirteen charges” according to one account - and the Federals lining the retrenchment methodically blasted them back. The space between the two gashes in the ground began to resemble a sepulchre, grotesquely lit by little more than gunfure blasts and artillery explosions. And in a particularly gruesome development, the men started building shelters out of the bodies of their comrades. All the while the nearly continuous fire from the gin house coursed through the huddled soldiers, exacting a bloody price with every sweep.

- Quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 43; Regarding the fire General George Gordon’s Confederate troops experienced as they fought in front of the Cotton Gin.

I never saw men put in such a terrible position as Cleburne’s division for a few minutes. The wonder is that any of them escaped death or capture.

- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.

Heads, arms, and legs were sticking out in almost every conceivable manner . . .  The air was filled with moans of the wounded.

- Capt. John Shellenberger, 50th Ohio, Union soldier.

It was impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers that November afternoon threw themsleves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. At some of the earthworks the press of men was so great that the dead having no place to fall, remained in an upright position.

- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.

Our loss of officers in the battle of Franklin on the 30th was excessively large in proportion to the loss of our men. The medical director reports a very large proportion of slightly wounded men.

- John Bell Hood, writing two days after the battle to Confederate  Secretary of War, James A. Seddon.  The South lost 53 of 100 regimental commanders in the field at Franklin.  Granbury’s brigade alone lost 70% of their regimental commanders.  Undeterred, Hood would unmercilously throw his beleaguered Army of Tennessee against Thomas in another suicidal attack just two weeks later, effectively destroying his army. He would be replaced within weeks of the loss at Nashville, having led the Army of Tennesse for roughly six months.

With the loss of Tennessee in early 1862 - the capture and surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson (Feb 62) - the Union victory at Shiloh (April 62) , and the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863; the South’s Western Theater military strategy had zero margin for error by mid/late 1864.

In light of that background, John Bell Hood seems to have singlehandedly cost the war for the South, or the Western Theater, at the very least, due to his performance in the last six months of 1864, having assumed command of the Army of Tennessee on July 17th, 1864.

a. Hood lost Atlanta on his watch, even though he’d say Johnston lost it. But, Hood wreckless, fight at any cost attitude (having assumed command in mid July 1864) resulted in losing 20,000 men in nine days after he took the AoT over. Hood hastened the loss of Atlanta and then his loss of the supply train to the Federals only showed his strategy for Atlanta was an inch thick. He then over-estimated his ability to draw Sherman out into a fight in the open. Sherman was brilliant in Atlanta.

b. Hood saw some measure of success in the Eastern Theater as a Brigade commander but seems to have had an almost racial dislike for the soldier in the Western Theater. He seemed to think the ANV soldier was superior in essence to the Western Theater soldier.

c. His loss of his leg and arm (1863) probably caused him to over-compensate for being less a man, in his own mind. Then throw in his failure to win the love of Preston Buck and you have a man with mixed passions in 1864.

d. He was no mental heavyweight. He barely survived West Point. He clearly lacked strategic and logistical/administrative abilities. He was a good Brigade Commander because he did not have to execute on those higher levels. A fighter he was. Being able to translate the will and passion to fight in light of the ‘then’-modern technologies, strategies and challenges was another thing.

e. Hood’s propensity for direct frontal assaults was simply ridiculous. He seems to have interpreted using the steel bayonet as a more manly way to fight, combined with assaulting breastworks. Henry repeating rifles could fire off about 20-30 rounds a minute compared to the 3-minute minnie ball. To fail to take this into account at Franklin was beyond my imagination to allow him room for being anything but being virtually insane after the escape of the Federals at Spring Hill.

f. Hood’s losses from Atlanta were devastating to the AoT. Losing 20,000 men in nine days - for his army - would be like Sherman losing perhaps 3-4 times that number. What was he thinking? That he’d actually defeat Sherman by fighting and winning tactically?

g. The Spring Hill situation really showed his weaknesses in many ways.

(1) His physical disabilities prevented him from being mobile and active enough to truely lead an army. His Division and Brigade commanders exhibited some of the bravest action in war at Franklin.

(2) How much did his opium-like medicine impair his ability?

(3) He was so disingenuous in his treatment of his commanders (especially after the war) in assigning blame for Spring Hill.

(4) The performance, or lack thereof, of his division commanders at Spring Hill are a direct reflection of Hood’s own poor logistical oversight. He seems to have very poorly understood the geography of the region.

(5) His lack of and poor administration of Forrest at Spring Hill/Franklin is mysterious.

The assault upon the Federals at Franklin displays Hood’s total ineptitude as a commander of an Army. Why?

1). Did he actually think he could destroy Schofield at Franklin by using just two of his three Corps and mostly not engaging his own artillery?

2). He marched across two miles of open ground before his corps reached the breastworks. It was more insane than Pickett’s Charge, with a greater loss of life too.

3). Had Wagner’s troops not been left out in the open to take the initial beating, then having to run for their lives, resulting in the Federals not being able to shoot the Confederates, the loss of life of Hood’s men would have been even much worse.

4). His inability to size up the situation, post-battle at Franklin, also reveals he did not deserve such authority he was given. To go after Thomas two weeks later was even more insane. At Franklin, Hood lost at least 1,700 in death and nearly 5,000 in wounded, captured or missing.

5). Hood really thought these AoT troops lacked the courage to assault defended breastworks. The Union - at Franklin - had the advantage of strategically placed artillery, defended breastworks, the choice of location to fight, abatis, superior numbers, superior equipment, men who were not nearly as hungry, etc.

Hood fought (late 1864) from a mixture of motives and demons that cost tens of thousands of lives. He had to prove to himself, Davis, and Buck Preston he was a real man; probably to his father as well. Not to mention proving his worthiness to the likes of Lee, Hardee, Johnston, Richard Taylor, and Stonewall Jackson. I think he was intimated by the likes of Cleburne and A.P. Stewart. He was a man of highly questionable integrity and character, as he showed in “reporting” on Johnston during Atlanta.

John Bell Hood got his time in the spotlight from July until December 1864 and the reality is that he was an abysmal failure as a commander of an army.

What a lesson?

When one is finally in a position of authority, one must be ready to execute from the foundation of a character molded in integrity, courage, and capability - birthed in humility. Anything less will reveal the deeply hidden or masked flaws of one’s character in the heat of battle.

CWG: When did the Federal income tax on personal income begin?

The Federal income tax on personal income began during the Civil War in 1861 during Abraham Lincoln’s administration. It violated the Constitution and was struck down at war’s end.

CWG: What percent in Federal tax revenue did Confederate states account for just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War (circa 1860)?

The Confederate states made up 87% of the tax revenue of the Federal treasury in 1860.

CWG: What was the primary form Federal taxes assumed just prior to the Civil War?

Before the War broke out Federal taxes were mostly in the form of excise taxes and tariffs (import taxes). Tariffs provided most of the Federal revenue in the form of taxes.

CWG: Why did Northern states use import taxes during the Civil War?

Northern states used import taxes as a way to protect their own manufacturers against Great Britain and other overseas competition. Northern imports brought in very little taxes for the government.

CWG: How did import taxes impact the South during the Civil War?

Unlike the North, the Southern states’ primary staple was King Cotton. The South depended heavily upon exporting cotton to overseas markets. Unlike the North, the South was an export-oriented economy. Thus import taxes on Southern cotton contributed greatly to the Federal tax revenue.

CWG: Since the North could not depend on revenues brought in from exported goods (i.e., cotton), how did the North generate revenue internally?

The North resorted to taxing it’s citizenry on such items as tobacco, alcohol, clothing, food stuffs, stamps, tools and even entertainment. The newly created Department of Internal Revenue (DIR) collected the taxes. Personal evasion of taxes was a common problem for the DIR.

CWG: What percent did taxes cover for the Civil War expenses of the North?

Taxes paid for roughly one-fifth of the North’s daily war efforts.

CWG: Where did the rest (i.e., four-fifths) of the money come from for the North?

It came from such forms as the creation of paper money, bonds and borrowing, This led to rampant inflation for the Northern economy due to an excessive proliferation of money.

CWG: How much did inflation affect the North from 1861-1865?

During the Civil War the cost of goods and services increased by 80% for the Northern states.

CWG: How much did inflation affect the South from 1861-1865?

During the Civil War the cost of goods and services increased by 60-70 times for the Southern states.

CWG: How much did it cost the North to wage Civil War on a daily basis?

About $1.75 million dollars was needed every day by the North to conduct its affairs on the military front, according to Anderson. Stevens says it was costing the North $2.5 million a day by the spring of 1863 (p. 106).

CWG: Prior to the changes in 1863 in bank charters, what kind of money or currency was in circulation in the United States?

There were many different forms of money in circulation prior to 1863, including private bank notes, government-minted gold and silver coins, Spanish dollars, and even private coins. There were as many as 1,500 different institutions issuing private bank notes. Private notes undermined the value of the Federal currency. They were printed in a variety of sizes, styles and denominations, thus making even simple transaction difficult to execute.

CWG: What did the Legal Tender Act of 1862 accomplish?

The Legal Tender Act of 1862 effectively outlawed privately minted gold and silver coins, and authorized the Federal Government to issue paper currency. It was printed with green ink on the back and thus became known as greenbacks. They were unbacked by gold and silver.

The government issued $500 million worth of bank notes during the war. By the end of the war, inflation having taken its toll, these same bank notes decreased in value by 61%.

CWG: How did the government use bonds to finance the Civil War?

At the beginning of 1863 the government relied heavily upon the sale of “five twenties” (six percent bonds, callable in five years and maturing in twenty). However, the demand for war bonds was unpredictable. They would rise and fall based on the military successes of failures of the North.

The government issued five kinds of paper currency during the war. For more information on the kinds of paper currency the North printed during the war see: http://www.financialhistory.org/civilwar/1861-1865/north/currency.htm

CWG: What were the first coins minted with the motto “In God we Trust” on them?

The Union 2-Cent pieces were the first U.S. coins minted with the motto, In God we Trust. These coins were bronze and were available from 1864-1865 during the war and actually up to 1873 after the war. They depict images of a shield, and eagle and a laurel sprig.

CWG: How were stamps used as “currency” during the Civil War?

Due to short supply of coins in the North, the government issued un-gummed stamps that could also be used as coinage.

CWG: Why did the Federal government stop minting coins after the Civil War began?

Facing a probable long war, the North decided to stop issuing coins and turned too printing paper money (i.e., greenbacks). As a result, many northerners panicked and started hoarding coins. Before long, most coins were no longer in circulation.

CWG: How did the Government respond to the crisis of coins being hoarded?

In response to the crisis, the Federal government issued fractional paper currency in denominations of 3, 5, 10, 15, 25, and 50 cents. These became known as shinplasters. People did eventually accept them as substitutes for metal coinage. The government stopped issuing fraction currency in 1876. By then $368 million worth of it made it into the private sector.

CWG: Did the South use similar means, as the North to finance the war effort (e.g., bonds, taxes and loans)?

In contrast with the North, the South primarily depended on paper currency to finance the war. As a result, inflation impacted the South even more since this currency was not backed by silver or gold. Currency was printed from 1861-1864. In 1861, when Confederate currency was first printed, it was worth 95 cents on the U.S. dollar. By 1863 they were trading at just 33 cents on the dollar. By April 9, 1965, at the war’s end, a Confederate dollar traded at just 1.6 cents on the dollar. On May 1, 1865 Confederate dollar bills were sold in bales of 1,200 notes for just $1 U.S. dollar.

CWG: How much currency was printed by the Southern government?

More than $1 billion was in circulation during the Civil War. Unfortunately, as much as $1.5 billion was printed in counterfeit Confederate currency. The North encouraged and promoted the counterfeiting of Confederate currency since it devalued the value of it.

CWG: What are some examples of paper denominational amounts that were printed by the South?

Confederate banknotes were printed in blue-gray color and became known as bluebacks. They were available in the following denominations: 5 cent note, 10 cent note, 15 cent note, 25 cent note, 50 cent note, $1 note, $1.75 note, $2 note, $3 note, $5 note, $10 note, $20 note, $50 note and $100 notes. $10 notes were the most widely printed note.

CWG: Were coins minted by the Confederacy?

Yes, coins were minted by the Confederacy but they were very rare, Experimental pennies (copper or silver, 1861) and half-dollars (silver, 1861) were minted by the South. Examples: .1 cent coin, .50 cent coin, $5 dollar coin.

CWG: What are some examples of paper denomination amounts that were printed by the Federal Government?

3 cent note, 5 cent note, 10 cent note, 25 cent note, $1 dollar note, $1, $2 dollar note, $5 dollar note, $10 dollar note, $50 dollar note

CWG: What kind of scenes did the South depict slaves on their printed currency?

Among the myriad of scenes depicting slave labor we find the following categories of images on printed currency: Individuals With Cotton Individuals With Assorted Tasks, Field Scenes Stylistic Scenes, Post Civil War Scenes, Sugar Plantations and Transportation. For more information see “Beyond Face Value” on the Web.

Letter by Adjutant John Andrews Fox of the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry to childhood friend William following the fall of Atlanta.

Head Quarters
Port Atlanta Ga
Oct. 26th 1864

William,

Our communications had been cut for about twenty days. I can assure you the excitement caused by the receipt of home letters was intense - not being either married or bespoken I took the matter philosophically though I confess to a certain amount of grim satisfaction.

I have been somewhat apprehensive lest you friends at home might worry during the blockade and conjure up horrid pictures of starvation or mule steak diet. T’ain’t so. We never lived better and we have as little idea of evacuating the place as we have of starving with plenty of forage within reach. You be sure the secesh widows and fatherless don’t like it, just let them leave alone our railroad. Our last raid brought us a pig, ten chickens, three barrels flour, six bushels, sweet potatoes, one keg syrup, corn meal, honey, beets, apples, dried peaches, etc. If this is staring famine in the face I can gaze calmly on its linearments for some days.

Found on Nate Sander’s auction web site: 12/24/06 Item #2410

Note:

• Shows the success of Union army living off the land during Atlanta campaign
• At the time of this letter, the 2nd Mass., was part of the Dept of the Army of Ohio and Cumberland

Pulaski, Tenn. / November 20th 1864

reads in part,

An old ‘darky’ in ‘Alabam’ said (one day as we were passing a plantation where about ‘five thousand’ were congregated along the road side - one of the boys asked him what he thought of the music (our band was playing) - his answer was ‘dunno, sah, but pears like tis getting mity glorious Shuah’ - it pears like the election news from Sherman,’ begin to make things look ‘mity glorious’ for the Union cause. As the particulars are brought out - the frauds on the part of the copperheads - their total everlasting defeat, it surely is encouraging to all at least sanguine can take hope the end is nigh.

Since the 4th of last month [Oct 4th] we have marched on foot about 300 miles - rode on the cars from Dalton, Ga. to down 40 miles south of Nashville from where we marched to this place making a distance of 15 miles from Nashville south. Hood with his rebel troops is supposed to be on the southern shore of the Tenn. River making an attempt to get into East Tenn. I hardly think he will win for we have the army of the Cumberland and Ohio here to whip him in case he wishes to fight or make a forward movement”

********************************************

Found on Nate Sanders auction site 12/24/06 Lot #2201 Item#20975

Notes:

• Soldier’s identity not yet determined
• Says that since the 4th of “last month” (probably October) his regiment has marched 300 miles.
• Timing of letter (i.e., October 4th 1864) starts the Nashville-Atlanta Campaign: Allatoona (Oct5), Decatur (Oct 26-29), and Johnsonville (Nov 4-5).
• Mentions defeat of the Copperheads in 1864 general election, refers to Sherman.
• Talks about how John Bell Hood’s interest if for East Tennesse.
• Says the Army of the Ohio and Cumberland are ready to whip Hood if he goes after Tennessee.
• This letter is written just ten days before the Battle of Franklin

Civil War Record of T.J. Williams
Transcribed from scan of originals by Kraig McNutt
December 2006

[page one]

War record of T.J. Williams who enlisted in Co D 120th Indiana Volunteer Infantry on the 10th day of November 1863 to serve 3 years or during the war.

We was located at Vincennes, Indiana in Old Camp Knox where our Regiment was organized.

We for three months was engaged in drilling and recruiting and preparing for the front. And during this time occurred the coldest New Year’s day and Eve.

So I was at home on a furlough first day of January 1864 and walked home to Princeton, Indiana. Returning to my Regiment, it was so cold quite a lot of chickens, hogs and sheep froze to death. Also one man froze at Camp Knox.

The first week of January 1864 we got our war equipments and our guns and started for the South. Went to Louisville, Ky was there only for a short time, then we marched to Nashville, TN. Was there only a short time and we marched from there to the front and went into the fight in good earnest on what is known as the Atlanta and Georgia campaign and for 60 days we was in a fight all the way from Nashville to the fall of Atlanta.

[page 2]

We was in a fight all summer at Big Shanty, Marietta and nearly all the stations along the Southern road to Atlanta. Some of the hardest fight was Columbia and Kingston, when Columbus Benson was shot and killed and Eliant [Eli] Briant was wounded. Lost several men at the Battle of Franklin.

So after Lee surrendered to Grant we moved into Raleigh, North Carolina, and thought we would soon be discharged and sent home. But lo and behold ordres came we had to stay until everything was settled up and we stayed there till 8th day of June 1866.

I was placed on guard at Gov. Vance’s residence, and in a short time we received word that President Lincoln was assassinated, and one of the most exciting times I ever saw, had to guard the town of Raleigh to keep soldiers from firing and burning it to ashes.

A few things I [will] never forget while in the service, at one time not engaged in battle, quite a number of the Boys was playing cards, having what they term a good time. All of a sudden we heard firing off to the right and the boom of cannon off to the left and officers riding back and forth, and we was soon in line and marching to the firing line where we hear we would have to face death. So the Boys began to throw away their cards. No one wanted to be killed with a deck of cards in his pocket. But I never saw a Testament thrown away during a battle.

A few outstanding events I ____services in the Civil [War], “One was the surrender of Gen Lee to Gen Grant on the march to Atlanta, Georgia. We stopped on Old Farm to eat dinner, had all eat and was sitting around waiting orders. Saw the Orderly riding his horse to Headquarters then Division Headquarters, hence to Brigade Headquarters, and Regimental Headquarters with orders that Lee had surrendered to Sam Grant, and of all the ______ that took place on that old farm.

[page 4]

The Boys shouted and yelled themselves hoarse, and some one set fire to a Turpentine Distillery and the blaze almost went to the sky. Then from there we moved in to Raleigh North Carolina. Took charge of all the government surplus. While there I was called to go to Richmond, Virginia. Was a guard for Gen Terry. I had a very pleasant trip. Went all over Richmond, also through Old Libby Prison where they kept our prisoners during the war. It was a shame a rough looking place. So we passed the summer of 1865 at Raleigh N.C., dispensing of government property, and finally on the 8th day of January 1866 we was discharged and sent home. One of the darkest places on earth. So ended my service in the Civil War and it was only through the goodness of God that I got through and got home.

TJ Williams

Richard F. Barter was Colonel of the 120th Indiana. This regiment was organized in the winter of 1863 at Columbus, and was mustered in March 1, 1864. It left the state March 20, proceeding to Louisville, Ky., where it was assigned to a brigade with Hovey’s division.

The flag of the 33rd Mississippi Infantry was captured as Winfield S. Featherston’s brigade (Loring’s Division) assaulted the position of eastern flank defended by the 120th and other regiments.

“The color-bearer of the Thirty-third was killed some fifteen paces from the works,” reported Brig. Gen. W.S. Featherston, “when Lieutenant H.C. Shaw, of Company K, carried them forward, and when in the act of planting them on the works was killed, his body falling in the trench, the colors falling in the works.”

Isaac C. Clark, 63rd Indiana Infantry [fought alongside the 120th], wrote the following account in his diary:

“We marched all night. Arrived at Franklin, Tenn. in the morning. Here we halted, and built a line of works, and we thought ( as the rebels seemed anxious for a fight, ) that we would try our hand on them at this place, so we made all necessary preparations. We had cannon placed along our line of works, about 50 yards apart, besides a number of well fortified forts, containing several pieces of artillery. At 4 o’clock p.m., the enemy came, they drove in our pickets and made a desperate charge upon our works, but were driven back with a great slaughter, however this did not satisfy them, and they came again and again until they had made as much as 8 or 10 different charges upon our works. They took a portion of our works at one time, but they were immediately retaken by our men; they fought with a desperation worthy of a better cause. The battle lasted 7 hours; we retreated at 11 p.m. Co. D., had one man killed, Co. E., one wounded. The enemy loss was reported at 8 or 10 thousand.

Our regt., had helped build a great many lines of works during the war, but this was the first time that they had the privilege of fighting behind works during a general engagement.

We retreated to Nashville, and went into camp at Fort Negley. The enemy followed us but they did not make a charge upon us at Nashville as they did at Franklin, I think that they had got about enough of charging; but they halted some distance from the city and built works. We remained in camp some 15 days, and there was some fighting going on every day during this time.”

Source:
“Reminiscences of an Old 63rd, Ind., Soldier”
By Isaac C. Clark
Covington, Ind., Nov. 27, 1875 http://www.indianainthecivilwar.com/letters/63rd/63diary.htm

A SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, TENN.; WITH REMINISCENCES OF CAMP DOUGLAS.
BY JOHN M. COPLEY. 1893.

The 49th TN, Co.B. was part of Walthall’s Division: Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall. Quarles’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William A. Quarles; Brig. Gen. George D.
Johnson (Nashville) with the following regiments all part:
1st Alabama; 42d, 46th, 48th, 49th, 53d, 55th Tennessee

As a member of Quarles’ brigade (C.S.A.), the 49th TN, of which Copley was a member, would have faced the most direct fire from Casement’s brigade (Union), more specifically primarily from the 124th Indiana, and secondarily, fromt he 65th Illinois.

Map showing detail of the location of the activity Copley describes below. The Quarles’s brigade is heading toward the Casement (Union) line. Copley is with the 49th TN. See a larger map showing where Walthall’s division fits into the overall Franklin battlefield.

Pages 47-61

Our division, General Walthall’s, was placed on the extreme right of the Columbia and Franklin pike, and formed the right wing and constituted the front line of battle of that position; this was to be the assailing column of the Federal works in our front. After this front line was definitely located, the remainder of our infantry began to form in lines of battle one behind the other. While this was going on the Federal army, who lay behind their main line of works, mounted on top of it, and stood for several minutes viewing our lines. We had a good view of them standing on top of their breast-works, their fine blue uniforms shining in the soft and hazy rays of a beautiful November’s afternoon. Our right wing was nearly in front of the battery of thirty-six cannon on the main line of the Federal works, and a little to the right of the battery of six pieces of cannon on same works. We thoroughly understood that this portion of the line of battle had to storm the works near the battery of thirty-six guns, and if possible, take it.

As soon as the lines of battle were formed, a number of our field officers rode out a little in front of the lines,—they were Walthall, Loring, Cheatham, Quarles, Cleburne, Granberry, and perhaps others; these officers appeared to hold a brief consultation, during which we could see them cast doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the depth of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all. These officers separated, each taking his respective place with his command. A profound silence pervaded the entire army; it was simply awful, reminding one of those sickening lulls which precede a tremendous thunderstorm. This was but momentary. Orders now rang down our line, shrill and clear, to forward march!

The guns from the redoubts northeast of the town opened on us at long range, but they were scarcely noticed by us. The artillerymen who were manning these guns had a fine opportunity of testing their skill at long range. Our progress at first was rather slow, on account of the obstructions just in our front, which consisted of the beech grove with the tops of the trees fronting us; but we surmounted this brush and fallen timber, and began to move a little faster. A light skirmish line from our lines of battle was thrown forward, which was soon met by a similar line from the Federals behind their advance line of intrenchments. These two lines quickly engaged in a lively skirmish fight, but as our lines of battle advanced, their line retired behind the line of works which they had recently left. Our line halted, lay down, and fired upon them in this position, until our lines of battle moved up close enough for them to join us, and become part of the front line.

We were now ordered to fix bayonets, fire, and charge the first line of works. They received us with a volley of musketry, but all opposition was inadequate to check our columns in the slightest degree, and with one prolonged and loud cheer we carried the first line of works at the very points of the Federal bayonets. They stood their ground until we mounted the top of their works, but as we went over, part of their line of battle broke and fled, while the remainder lay down flat on their faces in the ditch to save themselves, and were either killed or captured; but few of those who fled succeeded in reaching their main line. Our lines of infantry swept over their works, annihilating nearly everything before us. This partial victory was quickly won. It appeared as if our troops had received an electric shock, which aroused their enthusiasm to its highest pitch, and the air resounded with loud shouts from our whole army, whichalmost made the earth over which we were going quake and tremble.

After taking this line of works, we made a momentary halt in order to reform our front line, but this was only for an instant; we now pressed closely at the heels of their retiring line, to storm the second. Their batteries immediately opened upon us with a perfect hailstorm of grape and canister, and when within a short distance of their main line, we encountered the abatis, or bois d’arc hedge, and also the line of cheval-de-frise; here the battery of thirty-six guns a little to our right, and that of twelve guns on our left, all double charged with grape and canister, pointing down our lines from both directions, thus enfilading them both ways from end to end, sent a tremendous deluge of shot and shell through our ranks, and these seconded by a murderous sheet of fire and lead from the infantry behind the works, and also another battery of six guns directly in our front, made the scene of carnage and destruction fearful to behold.

This hurricane of combustibles now burst forth in its height of fury, leaving ruin and desolation in its pathway, and nothing could be heard above the din of musketry and the roar of cannon, which was incessant. They fired on friend and foe, for we so closely pressed the retreating line in our front that had they waited for their own men to enter the works we would have gone over with them, and carried all before us. Whenever the dense smoke, in some degree, was cleared away by the flash and blaze from the guns, great masses of our infantry could be seen struggling to get over those ingeniously wrought obstructions, who were being slain by hundreds and piled in almost countless numbers. In the confusion which here ensued, numbers of our forces were thrown farther to the left and near the pike, forming a confused body of soldiers who were totally oblivious to all sense of order, thus giving the battery of thirty-six cannon on our right, the one of six pieces in our front, and that of twelve to our left, full play upon them. The firing of these guns was so rapid that it was impossible to discover any interval between their discharges.

The slaughtering of human life could be seen down the line as far as the Columbia and Franklin pike, and where the works crossed the pike the destruction was indescribable. Along that portion of the works in front of the batteries on the right, our troops were killed by whole platoons; our front line of battle seemed to have been cut down by the first discharge, for in many places they were lying on their faces in almost as good order as if they had lain down on purpose; but no such order prevailed amongst the dead who fell in making the attempt to surmount the cheval-de-frise, for hanging on the long spikes of this obstruction could be seen the mangled and torn remains of many of our soldiers who had been pierced by hundreds of minie balls and grape shot, showing that they, beyond a possible doubt, had been killed simultaneously with the panic and consternation which happened upon their reaching this obstruction. The remnant of our lines succeeded in reaching the ditch on the outside of the works, and now became engaged in a hand to hand conflict across the top of the head-logs at the point of the bayonet. The smoke of battle belched forth from the hideous open mouth of this typical volcanic eruption cast a deep shade of gloom over that bright and lovely November eve, darkening the ether from earth to heaven, until a gentle breeze would lift and fan it away. The force and wind of the grape and canister, when fired from the fifty-four pieces of cannon on the Federal works, aided by that of the minie balls from their infantry behind the works, would lift us clear off the ground at every discharge. As the great clouds of smoke had to some extent vanished and I could look around me, I saw to my surprise I was left alone in the ditch, within a few feet and to the left of the battery of six guns on the Federal works, which was still pouring forth its messengers of death, and not a living man could be seen standing on my right; neither could one be seen for some distance on my left. They had all been swept away by that mighty tempest of grape and canister and rolling waves of fire and lead. A Federal, who was running in my front just before we entered the ditch, and a little beyond the reach of my bayonet, was shot dead from the works in front, and fell forward into the ditch; in his belt were two large army pistols, which were loaded and capped. I quickly removed them from his belt, and with one in each hand emptied them under the head-logs at the mass of men across the works in my front. The more our numbers became reduced the fiercer the conflict for life, simply too dreadful for pen to describe, and few who entered that portion of the ditch escaped death. When the pistols were emptied, having nothing with which to reload them, I reloaded my gun, and turned towards the embrasure of the cannon, which was a few feet on my right, and tried my best to shoot the artillerymen who were so skillfully and effectively manning that destructive battery, and whose gun swabs would whirl in the air after every discharge, but each time I obtained a glimpse of any of them, and before I could shoot, a cannon would run out and fire, forcing me to take refuge away from it. After getting my face blistered and eyebrows burned off, I abandoned that dangerous place by getting back away from the blaze of these guns.

Streams of blood ran here and there over the entire battle ground, in little branches, and one could have walked upon dead and wounded men from one end of the column to the other; the ditch was full of dead men and we had to stand and sit upon them,—the bottom of it, from side to side, was covered with blood to the depth of the shoe soles.

At the ditch we had to encounter an enfilading fire of musketry from both directions, as well as that in our front across the works under the head-logs. The enemy directly in our front attempted to shoot us by turning their backs to the breast works, taking their guns by the breach and raising them above their heads over the head-logs, so as to point the muzzles downward, firing them at us this way, and having nothing exposed except their arms and hands. We had to watch this and knock their guns aside with our bayonets, which was done several times; many of their men had both hands shot off while making these attempts to kill us. While this fearful battle was raging, a Federal officer on his horse, at the head of a line of infantry, came dashing up to the works in our front, and one of our soldiers in the ditch about ten feet on my left, raised his gun and fired, shooting him off his horse. Among the first whom I saw in the ditch, upon their feet and unhurt, were General Geo. W. Gordon, Lieutenant Colonel Atkins, commander of our regiment, and Captain Williams, of an Alabama regiment; they were only a few feet on my left. These men appeared to be undaunted, and a look of stoic determination had settled upon their weather-beaten faces.

South of the Columbia and Franklin pike our troops were in some degree successful in capturing part of the line of works; the Federals who survived this onslaught took refuge behind the works on the north side of the pike, in our front. Our numbers were too weak on that portion of the line to charge the position in our front with any hope of success; however, they succeeded in reaching the brick houses I have described. At the residence and in the yard of Mr. Carter his son was killed dead. He had not been at home for two or three years, and as he passed through the yard and stopped at the door his sister ran and caught him by the hand and attempted to throw her arms around his neck, when a Federal soldier, who had taken refuge in the house, ran up and shot him through the body, killing him dead in the arms of his sister.

General Quarles and Adjutant General Cowley, of our brigade, fell near the main line of the Federal works, the former wounded and the latter killed. General Pat Cleburne and his horse were killed while attempting to cross the works, the horse falling on top of the breast works and General Cleburne on the outside of the ditch; both rider and horse seemed to have received a missile of death at one and the same instant.

The color-bearer and color-guard of our regiment were all killed near the edge of the ditch; the last man of the color-guard was shot while waving the regimental colors at the breast-works, and fell forward, the flag reaching over within the Federal works, the staff resting across the head-logs. Some brave soldier of our little remnant quickly seized the staff, recovered the flag and carried it off the field. I regret never having learned his name. This deadly strife was destined to be of short duration; as our attacking columns were destroyed and repulsed, the firing became less frequent, except from our batteries in the rear, which were kept active by the fearless and solitary few who survived this bloody encounter.

The carnage and destruction was so dreadful that the sun, as if loath to longer gaze on this terrific scene, slowly sunk behind the western horizon and hid from view his smiling face; but the stars, more pitying, came forth to keep vigil o’er the silent and sleeping dead.

As the firing from the enemy in our front began somewhat to abate, sixteen of our soldiers, who were in the ditch some twenty or thirty feet on my left, sprang up and ran out of the ditch, attempting to escape; a whole volley of musketry was fired at them, killing the last one to a man. When they started I raised in a stooping posture, thinking I would run also; but they being killed so quickly caused me to abandon the idea of escape. The few of us who were alive at the ditch were in considerable danger from our own batteries and stray minie balls. We tried to lie down in the ditch; it afforded scant protection, being almost full of dead men.

We now fully realized our critical situation, and saw that we had but one choice, if any, left, and that to surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Atkins was requested to surrender the little crowd, but declined, stating that he would rather die in the ditch than to surrender us. Some few of our soldiers, a little further on our left, raised their caps on ramrods, but they were fired upon and riddled with bullets, the Federals refusing to recognize this. Captain Williams then requested some one to hand him a white handkerchief, but not one could be found. One of our soldiers who was fortunate enough to have on a white shirt, tore off a large piece and handed it to him. The captain tied this on the end of a ramrod, and hoisted it over our heads so it could be seen by the Federals. A Federal officer ordered the troops in our front to cease firing, which they did. He came up to the works, looked over and said: “Throw down your arms, boys, and come over.” I threw my gun and the two pistols as far back toward our lines as I could send them, and as I passed over the works glanced around at my fallen comrades who lay on the ground wrapped in the winding sheet of death, and drew a sigh of regret as I gave them a last sad look, knowing they never again would be aroused by the sound of the reveille from their deep untroubled sleep, but would remain in death’s cold embrace until the last great trump shall sound and call forth the dead from the armies of both friend and foe.

pp. 47-61

A SKETCH OF THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, TENN.; WITH REMINISCENCES OF CAMP DOUGLAS.
BY JOHN M. COPLEY. 1893.

The 49th TN, Co.B. was part of Walthall’s Division: Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall. Quarles’s Brigade: Brig. Gen. William A. Quarles; Brig. Gen. George D.
Johnson (Nashville) with the following regiments all part:
1st Alabama; 42d, 46th, 48th, 49th, 53d, 55th Tennessee

As a member of Quarles’ brigade (C.S.A.), the 49th TN, of which Copley was a member, would have faced the most direct fire from Casement’s brigade (Union), more specifically primarily from the 124th Indiana, and secondarily, fromt he 65th Illinois.

Map showing detail of the location of the activity Copley describes below. The Quarles’s brigade is heading toward the Casement (Union) line. Copley is with the 49th TN. See a larger map showing where Walthall’s division fits into the overall Franklin battlefield.

Pages 47-61

Our division, General Walthall’s, was placed on the extreme right of the Columbia and Franklin pike, and formed the right wing and constituted the front line of battle of that position; this was to be the assailing column of the Federal works in our front. After this front line was definitely located, the remainder of our infantry began to form in lines of battle one behind the other. While this was going on the Federal army, who lay behind their main line of works, mounted on top of it, and stood for several minutes viewing our lines. We had a good view of them standing on top of their breast-works, their fine blue uniforms shining in the soft and hazy rays of a beautiful November’s afternoon. Our right wing was nearly in front of the battery of thirty-six cannon on the main line of the Federal works, and a little to the right of the battery of six pieces of cannon on same works. We thoroughly understood that this portion of the line of battle had to storm the works near the battery of thirty-six guns, and if possible, take it.

As soon as the lines of battle were formed, a number of our field officers rode out a little in front of the lines,—they were Walthall, Loring, Cheatham, Quarles, Cleburne, Granberry, and perhaps others; these officers appeared to hold a brief consultation, during which we could see them cast doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the depth of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all. These officers separated, each taking his respective place with his command. A profound silence pervaded the entire army; it was simply awful, reminding one of those sickening lulls which precede a tremendous thunderstorm. This was but momentary. Orders now rang down our line, shrill and clear, to forward march!

The guns from the redoubts northeast of the town opened on us at long range, but they were scarcely noticed by us. The artillerymen who were manning these guns had a fine opportunity of testing their skill at long range. Our progress at first was rather slow, on account of the obstructions just in our front, which consisted of the beech grove with the tops of the trees fronting us; but we surmounted this brush and fallen timber, and began to move a little faster. A light skirmish line from our lines of battle was thrown forward, which was soon met by a similar line from the Federals behind their advance line of intrenchments. These two lines quickly engaged in a lively skirmish fight, but as our lines of battle advanced, their line retired behind the line of works which they had recently left. Our line halted, lay down, and fired upon them in this position, until our lines of battle moved up close enough for them to join us, and become part of the front line.

We were now ordered to fix bayonets, fire, and charge the first line of works. They received us with a volley of musketry, but all opposition was inadequate to check our columns in the slightest degree, and with one prolonged and loud cheer we carried the first line of works at the very points of the Federal bayonets. They stood their ground until we mounted the top of their works, but as we went over, part of their line of battle broke and fled, while the remainder lay down flat on their faces in the ditch to save themselves, and were either killed or captured; but few of those who fled succeeded in reaching their main line. Our lines of infantry swept over their works, annihilating nearly everything before us. This partial victory was quickly won. It appeared as if our troops had received an electric shock, which aroused their enthusiasm to its highest pitch, and the air resounded with loud shouts from our whole army, whichalmost made the earth over which we were going quake and tremble.

After taking this line of works, we made a momentary halt in order to reform our front line, but this was only for an instant; we now pressed closely at the heels of their retiring line, to storm the second. Their batteries immediately opened upon us with a perfect hailstorm of grape and canister, and when within a short distance of their main line, we encountered the abatis, or bois d’arc hedge, and also the line of cheval-de-frise; here the battery of thirty-six guns a little to our right, and that of twelve guns on our left, all double charged with grape and canister, pointing down our lines from both directions, thus enfilading them both ways from end to end, sent a tremendous deluge of shot and shell through our ranks, and these seconded by a murderous sheet of fire and lead from the infantry behind the works, and also another battery of six guns directly in our front, made the scene of carnage and destruction fearful to behold.

This hurricane of combustibles now burst forth in its height of fury, leaving ruin and desolation in its pathway, and nothing could be heard above the din of musketry and the roar of cannon, which was incessant. They fired on friend and foe, for we so closely pressed the retreating line in our front that had they waited for their own men to enter the works we would have gone over with them, and carried all before us. Whenever the dense smoke, in some degree, was cleared away by the flash and blaze from the guns, great masses of our infantry could be seen struggling to get over those ingeniously wrought obstructions, who were being slain by hundreds and piled in almost countless numbers. In the confusion which here ensued, numbers of our forces were thrown farther to the left and near the pike, forming a confused body of soldiers who were totally oblivious to all sense of order, thus giving the battery of thirty-six cannon on our right, the one of six pieces in our front, and that of twelve to our left, full play upon them. The firing of these guns was so rapid that it was impossible to discover any interval between their discharges.

The slaughtering of human life could be seen down the line as far as the Columbia and Franklin pike, and where the works crossed the pike the destruction was indescribable. Along that portion of the works in front of the batteries on the right, our troops were killed by whole platoons; our front line of battle seemed to have been cut down by the first discharge, for in many places they were lying on their faces in almost as good order as if they had lain down on purpose; but no such order prevailed amongst the dead who fell in making the attempt to surmount the cheval-de-frise, for hanging on the long spikes of this obstruction could be seen the mangled and torn remains of many of our soldiers who had been pierced by hundreds of minie balls and grape shot, showing that they, beyond a possible doubt, had been killed simultaneously with the panic and consternation which happened upon their reaching this obstruction. The remnant of our lines succeeded in reaching the ditch on the outside of the works, and now became engaged in a hand to hand conflict across the top of the head-logs at the point of the bayonet. The smoke of battle belched forth from the hideous open mouth of this typical volcanic eruption cast a deep shade of gloom over that bright and lovely November eve, darkening the ether from earth to heaven, until a gentle breeze would lift and fan it away. The force and wind of the grape and canister, when fired from the fifty-four pieces of cannon on the Federal works, aided by that of the minie balls from their infantry behind the works, would lift us clear off the ground at every discharge. As the great clouds of smoke had to some extent vanished and I could look around me, I saw to my surprise I was left alone in the ditch, within a few feet and to the left of the battery of six guns on the Federal works, which was still pouring forth its messengers of death, and not a living man could be seen standing on my right; neither could one be seen for some distance on my left. They had all been swept away by that mighty tempest of grape and canister and rolling waves of fire and lead. A Federal, who was running in my front just before we entered the ditch, and a little beyond the reach of my bayonet, was shot dead from the works in front, and fell forward into the ditch; in his belt were two large army pistols, which were loaded and capped. I quickly removed them from his belt, and with one in each hand emptied them under the head-logs at the mass of men across the works in my front. The more our numbers became reduced the fiercer the conflict for life, simply too dreadful for pen to describe, and few who entered that portion of the ditch escaped death. When the pistols were emptied, having nothing with which to reload them, I reloaded my gun, and turned towards the embrasure of the cannon, which was a few feet on my right, and tried my best to shoot the artillerymen who were so skillfully and effectively manning that destructive battery, and whose gun swabs would whirl in the air after every discharge, but each time I obtained a glimpse of any of them, and before I could shoot, a cannon would run out and fire, forcing me to take refuge away from it. After getting my face blistered and eyebrows burned off, I abandoned that dangerous place by getting back away from the blaze of these guns.

Streams of blood ran here and there over the entire battle ground, in little branches, and one could have walked upon dead and wounded men from one end of the column to the other; the ditch was full of dead men and we had to stand and sit upon them,—the bottom of it, from side to side, was covered with blood to the depth of the shoe soles.

At the ditch we had to encounter an enfilading fire of musketry from both directions, as well as that in our front across the works under the head-logs. The enemy directly in our front attempted to shoot us by turning their backs to the breast works, taking their guns by the breach and raising them above their heads over the head-logs, so as to point the muzzles downward, firing them at us this way, and having nothing exposed except their arms and hands. We had to watch this and knock their guns aside with our bayonets, which was done several times; many of their men had both hands shot off while making these attempts to kill us. While this fearful battle was raging, a Federal officer on his horse, at the head of a line of infantry, came dashing up to the works in our front, and one of our soldiers in the ditch about ten feet on my left, raised his gun and fired, shooting him off his horse. Among the first whom I saw in the ditch, upon their feet and unhurt, were General Geo. W. Gordon, Lieutenant Colonel Atkins, commander of our regiment, and Captain Williams, of an Alabama regiment; they were only a few feet on my left. These men appeared to be undaunted, and a look of stoic determination had settled upon their weather-beaten faces.

South of the Columbia and Franklin pike our troops were in some degree successful in capturing part of the line of works; the Federals who survived this onslaught took refuge behind the works on the north side of the pike, in our front. Our numbers were too weak on that portion of the line to charge the position in our front with any hope of success; however, they succeeded in reaching the brick houses I have described. At the residence and in the yard of Mr. Carter his son was killed dead. He had not been at home for two or three years, and as he passed through the yard and stopped at the door his sister ran and caught him by the hand and attempted to throw her arms around his neck, when a Federal soldier, who had taken refuge in the house, ran up and shot him through the body, killing him dead in the arms of his sister.

General Quarles and Adjutant General Cowley, of our brigade, fell near the main line of the Federal works, the former wounded and the latter killed. General Pat Cleburne and his horse were killed while attempting to cross the works, the horse falling on top of the breast works and General Cleburne on the outside of the ditch; both rider and horse seemed to have received a missile of death at one and the same instant.

The color-bearer and color-guard of our regiment were all killed near the edge of the ditch; the last man of the color-guard was shot while waving the regimental colors at the breast-works, and fell forward, the flag reaching over within the Federal works, the staff resting across the head-logs. Some brave soldier of our little remnant quickly seized the staff, recovered the flag and carried it off the field. I regret never having learned his name. This deadly strife was destined to be of short duration; as our attacking columns were destroyed and repulsed, the firing became less frequent, except from our batteries in the rear, which were kept active by the fearless and solitary few who survived this bloody encounter.

The carnage and destruction was so dreadful that the sun, as if loath to longer gaze on this terrific scene, slowly sunk behind the western horizon and hid from view his smiling face; but the stars, more pitying, came forth to keep vigil o’er the silent and sleeping dead.

As the firing from the enemy in our front began somewhat to abate, sixteen of our soldiers, who were in the ditch some twenty or thirty feet on my left, sprang up and ran out of the ditch, attempting to escape; a whole volley of musketry was fired at them, killing the last one to a man. When they started I raised in a stooping posture, thinking I would run also; but they being killed so quickly caused me to abandon the idea of escape. The few of us who were alive at the ditch were in considerable danger from our own batteries and stray minie balls. We tried to lie down in the ditch; it afforded scant protection, being almost full of dead men.

We now fully realized our critical situation, and saw that we had but one choice, if any, left, and that to surrender. Lieutenant Colonel Atkins was requested to surrender the little crowd, but declined, stating that he would rather die in the ditch than to surrender us. Some few of our soldiers, a little further on our left, raised their caps on ramrods, but they were fired upon and riddled with bullets, the Federals refusing to recognize this. Captain Williams then requested some one to hand him a white handkerchief, but not one could be found. One of our soldiers who was fortunate enough to have on a white shirt, tore off a large piece and handed it to him. The captain tied this on the end of a ramrod, and hoisted it over our heads so it could be seen by the Federals. A Federal officer ordered the troops in our front to cease firing, which they did. He came up to the works, looked over and said: “Throw down your arms, boys, and come over.” I threw my gun and the two pistols as far back toward our lines as I could send them, and as I passed over the works glanced around at my fallen comrades who lay on the ground wrapped in the winding sheet of death, and drew a sigh of regret as I gave them a last sad look, knowing they never again would be aroused by the sound of the reveille from their deep untroubled sleep, but would remain in death’s cold embrace until the last great trump shall sound and call forth the dead from the armies of both friend and foe.

pp. 47-61

THE THIRTY-FIFTH ALABAMA INFANTRY.

The Thirty-fifth regiment was organized at La Grange in April, 1862; ordered to Corinth, it was brigaded under General Breckinridge, and went to Louisiana under his command.

It took part in the engagement at Baton Rouge, August 5th, where the regiment lost heavily and displayed the superb character of its officers and men.  At Port Hudson it was highly complimented by General Breckinridge.

At Corinth, October 3rd, its losses again were heavy and General Van Dorn praised its work.  It fought in Loring’s division at Baker’s Creek, and, after the siege of Jackson, was ordered to Tennessee, but was sent back to Mississippi early in 1864.

It took part in the fighting in Georgia and the battles around Atlanta.  Under Hood at Decatur it lost heavily, and at Franklin, November 30th, lost a large proportion of its force.

At Nashville, December 15th and 16th, its loss was comparatively small.  It went into the Carolinas and was surrendered with the remnants of the Twenty-seventh and Forty-ninth, with which it had been consolidated the previous summer, under its gallant commander, Col. A. E. Ashford.

Capt. Thaddeus Felton was killed at Corinth; Capt. Samuel D. Stewart killed and Capt. J. B. Patten wounded at Franklin.  Capt John Hanna died in the service.

The field officers were Col. James W. Robertson; Edwin Goodwin, who died in the service; Samuel S. Ives, wounded at Franklin, and A. E. Ashford. Majs. William Hunt and John S. Dickson, killed at Franklin.

Source:  Confederate Military History, vol. VIII, p. 167

J. Bailey, Pvt. When he enlisted at age 26 in Co. E.
Wounded 11/30/1864 Franklin, TN (Severe wound in left leg, amputated)

Daniel L. Downs, Sgt. Was 22 yrs old at enlistment in Co., B.  Was promoted to 1st Sgt.  Taken POW at Franklin.  Wounded 11/30/1864 Franklin, TN (Severely wounded in left leg, amputated)

Samuel S. Ives, Captain at enlistment; into Co., A.
Promotions: Major, Lt Col., Colonel

• A.E. Ashford - major
• Maj. William H. Hunt, was in Company B
• Maj. John S. Dickson, served in Company E

THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ALABAMA INFANTRY.

The Twenty-seventh Alabama regiment was organized at Fort Heiman, in Tennessee, in the winter of 1861.

It was sent to Fort Henry, then to Fort Donelson, where it was captured, though many of the command, being sick in the hospital, escaped the surrender and joined a Mississippi regiment.  The captured men were exchanged in September, 1862, and were at Port Hudson during the winter.

The regiment fought bravely at Baker’s Creek, May 16, 1863, in the Jackson trenches, and in the retreat across Pearl river; passed the winter of 1863 at Canton.  In the spring of 1864, when recruiting at Tuscumbia, it crossed the river and captured a Federal camp, with all the horses, arms and men.

Beginning with Dalton it fought through the Georgia campaign with the army of Tennessee; at Peachtree Creek made a glorious record for dauntless courage; John E. Abernathy there captured the colors of a New Jersey regiment.  It fought with heroism at Franklin, and again at Nashville.

The regiment in the summer of 1864 was consolidated with the remnants of the Thirty-fifth and Forty-ninth (after April 9, 1865; also the Fifty-fifth and Fifty-seventh, under Col. Ed. McAlexander), and was surrendered at Greensboro, N. C.

Col. A. A. Hughes was captured at Fort Donelson; afterward died in the service.  Colonel Ives was wounded at the battle of Franklin. Capt. W. A. Isbell, and Lieut. T. S. Taylor were killed at Baker’s Creek.  Capt. William Wood was killed at Perryville.

Commanders: Cols. A. A. Hughes, James Jackson, and, after consolidation, S. S. Ives, Lieut.-Col. Edward McAlexander, Maj. R. G. Wright. Colonel Jackson was for a time in command of Loring’s division.

Source:  Confederate Military History, vol. VIII, p. 143

Sidney S. Anderson, Captain, later taken as POW.  Wounded 11/30/1864 Franklin, TN (Severe wound in left arm, amputated).  Transferred 5/31/1865 Provost Marshal

4th Mississippi wounded soldiers at Franklin

• Thomas N. Adair was a Captain when enlisting.  Saw promotions to Major, Lt. Col. and Colonel.
• T.T. Bates was a sgt., when he enlisted into Co., K.
• J.E. Bowie was a Corpl., when he enlisted in Co., K.
• William E. Brasher was a private when he enlisted into Co., D.
• Wyatt Brasher enlisted as a sgt., into Co.D., later transferring to Co.,G
• C.C. Clements enlisted as a Corpl., into Co., D.
• Henry Counts enlisted as a sgt., in Co.D.,
• William Counts enlisted as a pvt., Co.D.,
• E.P. Holmes enlisted as a sgt., Co.E.,
• G.W. Kerr enlisted as a pvt., Co. H.,
• S.W. King enlisted as a Corpl., Co. E.,
• A.C. McComb enlisted as a Pvt., Co. K.,
• John A. Pyron enlisted as a Pvt., Co. E.,
• J. Russell enlisted as a Pvt., Co.H.,
• J.W. Russell enlisted as a Corpl., Co.H.,
• James B. Smith enlisted as a Sgt., in Co.A.,
• J.W. Stephens enlisted as a pvt., in Co.D.,
• Joseph W. Westbrook enlisted at age 20, as a 2nd Lt., in Co.B. (Attala Yellow Jackets), taken as POW at Franklin.  Severley wounded in left leg and was amputated.

4th Mississippi (KIA)

• William H. Cook, was a private when he enlisted into Co., B.
• J.J. Cowey, was a private when enlisted in Co., C.
• L.O. Paris was a Captain when he enlisted in Co. D.
• W.H. Patton was a private when enlisted in Co. D.
• W.H. Sartain was a private when enlisted in Co. D.
• G.D. Taylor enlisted as a Sgt. in Co. H.
• John T. Thornton enlisted as a Corpl., in Co. B.

Have not entered soldiers as separate entries yet.

John M. Hickey, listed as a lawyer, enlisted as a Captain from Howard County. Wounded in October 1862 at Corinth.   Wounded in right leg and shoulder at Franklin. Served in “F” Co. MO 3rd Battn Infantry then Co. H, 6th MO.  He died in Columbia, TN 10/3/1927. Is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Patrick Canniff, enlisted as a Captain into Co., F.  Killed at Franklin.

John Wilson was 20 yrs old at enlistment into Co., E.  Took a severe wound in right forearm at Franklin; and POW.  He transferred from Co. E to H.

John A. Payne
Was 19 when he enlisted into Co. I., He was severely wounded in his left leg and was amputated, at Franklin.  Taken as POW too.

Francis Marion Cockrell
Was a private when he enlisted into Co H.. Promoted to Captain, then Lt Col in May 1862 and to Colonel in July 1862. He was born 10/1/34 in Warrensburg, MO; and died on 12/13/1915 in Washington, DC.

William F. Carter
Was a 2nd Lt when enlisted. Served in Companies F and C. Saw promotions to Captain and Major. He was born 3/4/1843 in Osceola, MO died 7/3/1930 in Clinton, MO.

Casualties at Franklin

William F. Carter
Was a 2nd Lt when enlisted.  Served in Companies F and C.  Saw promotions to Captain and Major.  He was born 3/4/1843 in Osceola, MO died 7/3/1930 in Clinton, MO.

Francis Marion Cockrell
Was a private when he enlisted into Co H..  Promoted to Captain, then Lt Col in May 1862 and to Colonel in July 1862.   He was born 10/1/34 in Warrensburg, MO; and died on 12/13/1915 in Washington, DC.

John A. Payne
Was 19 when he enlisted into Co. I., He was severely wounded in his left leg and was amputated, at Franklin.  Taken as POW too.

Probably at the hands of the 65th Indiana

Regimental History of the One Hundred and Twentieth Infantry
INDIANA (3-YEARS)

One Hundred and Twentieth Infantry. — Cols. Richard F. Barter Allen W. Prather, Reuben C. Kise; Lieut.-Cols., Allen W. Prather, Reuben C. Kise, John M. Barcus, Majs., Reuben C. Kise, Edward B. Brasher, John M. Barcus, Albert Knowles.

This regiment was organized in the winter of 1863 at Columbus, and was mustered in March 1, 1864.  It left the state March 20, proceeding to Louisville, Ky., where it was assigned to a brigade with Hovey’s division.

It moved to Nashville and on April 5, for Charlestown, Tenn., being assigned to the 1st brigade, 1st division, 23rd army corps.  Moving May 2 in the Atlanta campaign, it was engaged at Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, taking a conspicuous part and joining in the charge which routed the enemy; in the assault of Kennesaw Mountain, and in the battle before Atlanta, July 22.

It was in the siege of Atlanta and in constant skirmishing until its evacuation being engaged at Jonesboro and Lovejoy’s Station.  Col. Barter resigning Sept. 15, Lieut.-Col. Prather was promoted to the colonelcy of the regiment, which moved in the pursuit of Hood in October as far as Summerville.

It was detached from Sherman’s army, Oct. 30, and ordered to Nashville, being in skirmishes at Columbia, and in the battle at Franklin, on Nov. 30, losing 48 in killed and wounded, Maj. Brasher being mortally wounded.

Moving to Nashville, it took position in line of battle and took part in the battle of Dec. 15-16, joining in the pursuit of Hood’s retreating forces, and going into camp at Clifton, Tenn.  Embarking Jan. 15, 1865, it moved to Cincinnati, thence to Washington City, from whence it proceeded to New Berne, N.C.

Moving on March 6, with its division towards Kinston, it was in a sharp fight at Wise’s Forks on the 8th and again on the 10th, when a furious assault was repulsed with heavy loss on the enemy.  The regiment occupied a position in the center, exposed to the heaviest attack, and lost 7 killed and 48 wounded.

Joining the forces under Gen. Cox at Kinston, it moved to Goldsboro, meeting Sherman’s army which had arrived from Fayetteville.  It was in camp at Goldsboro until April 10, when it moved towards Smithfield, proceeding thence to Raleigh, where it was engaged in provost duty with the army encamped about the city.

It then moved to Charlotte, N. C., May 10, remaining there for three months and moving thence to Greensboro.  It was ordered to Raleigh, Aug. 21, for garrison duty.  Col. Prather resigned Sept. 9, Lieut.-Col. Kise was promoted colonel, and on Dec. 2, was made brigadier-general of volunteers for distinguished services.

The regiment was mustered out Jan. 6 1866.  Original strength, 976; gain by recruits, 219; total, 1,195. Loss by death, 151 ; desertion 5 2.

Source: The Union Army, vol. 3, p. 178