You are currently browsing the monthly archive for December 2006.
Columbia Tenn
Dec 28th 1864
Dear Sister,
I received a long letter from you today. I reply not because there is anything of importance transpiring just at present, but because when the most happens is the time I am entirely unable to write. Since I was last at Columbia we have had some stirring times. Hood drove us back to Nashville. We had a very severe battle at Franklin during which our Regiment lost in killed wounded & captured some thing over half its men. After that we were in the big fight at Nashville & our company lost its Commanding Officer, a fine man who was shot through the breast & had an arm broken by a musket ball. But the success atoned for all the loss & more. 
Hood has halted at Columbia again. The rest of the Army has gone down after Hood. How long we shall remain here idle I know not but presume we shall have plenty to do. Sherman has taken Savannah & Hardee has escaped with his 15,000 men & will probably reinforce Hood which will give him a chance to show us considerable fight. But we shall conquer in the end. The right will triumph in the end. Charleston will be taken next and all important Sea ports. Christmas is over & I thought often of the fine times you were having at home. We had rather hard times living on hard tack & sow belly. It is quite cold to night, I have just had an argument on Slavery with the Captain who is for allowing the slaveholders credit for honesty on account of early education and I am not. I would just as — take a horse or hoe from one of these men as not. But I must stop writing. Having passed safely through the Battle of Franklin I expect good times for a while. Let me know if any thing new happening and you hear from Thomas.
Goodbye.
Your Bro. A.M.Weston
Asa M. Weston enlisted on 8/11/62 as Sergeant in Company K, 50th Ohio Infantry. He survived the Civil War.
The fiercest fighting during the battle of Franklin (November 30, 1864) centered around the home of Fountain Branch Carter (see above), looking East. Hundreds of wounded and dead could be seen from the porch after the battle. Many of those – Confederate soldiers – would eventually be interred at McGavock cemetery close by.
The CWG recommends visiting this web site: Virtual Antietam.
CWG: How many soldiers fought during the Civil War?
KM: 3.8 million men (and many boys) fought during the Civil War, from 1861 – 1865.
CWG: How many fought for the Union?
KM: 2.8 million fought to preserve the Union, roughly 13% of the total Northern population.
CWG: How many fought for the South?
KM: Just over 1 million fought for the Confederacy. Considering there were around 5 million non-blacks in the South in 1860, that accounts for roughly 20% of the total Southern (non-black) population.
CWG: How common was it to be wounded in the Civil War?
KM: For every 1,000 Federals (roughly the size of a Regiment at the beginning of the war), 112 were wounded. That number was higher for Confederates; 150 of every 1,000 Confederates were wounded.
CWG: Did battle wounds kill more soldiers or disease?
KM: Disease was much more deadly overall. While a Union soldier stood a 1 in 18 chance of dying in battle, he stood a 1 in 8 chance of dying of disease. Johnny Reb stood a 1 in 5 chance of dying of disease and a 1 in 8 chance of dying in combat.
CWG: how was the North and South, respectively ready for the casualties they faced inthe Civil War?
KM: Neither side was ready. The entire U.S. Army only had about 16,000 regular soldiers before the Civil War broke out, and most of those were out West. In April 1862 at the battle of Shiloh we see the first real staggering casualty numbers of the war. In just two days the Union lost over 10,000 men (killed or wounded) and the Confederates lost 9,700. That’s nearly 20,000 men in one battle.
CWG: this must have put an incredible strain on the ability to care for the wounded and dying.
KM: These kind of casualty numbers caused an enormous strain on the medical care required for the soldiers. When the War broke out there were just 113 surgeons in the U.S. Army, by the end there would be 12,000 in the Union ranks, and an additional 3,200 in the Confederate Army. Many men no doubt expired on the field having simply bled to death before proper care could be administered.
CWG: did medical care improve much as the war continued?
KM: Care for the wounded improved greatly as the War drew on. Mortality rates for surgeries especially improved as doctors improved their understanding of the body, disease, and the application of medical procedures.
Interview with Professor Steven E. Woodworth
12/27/2006
Recommended reading for this interview?
- Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Woodworth
- The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, Sword
- For Cause & For Country, Jacobson
Subject: John Bell Hood’s Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns (1864)
Also: read the interview with Dr. Woodworth about troop unit sizes during the Civil War
CWG: it’s pretty popular to bash Hood. There seems to be a strong Hood-hater crowd. Your thoughts?
SW: I think Hood has received something less than a fair shake from the historians, especially from those like Sword. For balance, read Steve Davis’s Atlanta Will Fall.
CWG: how important is the background to the Atlanta campaign important in understanding Hood’s involvement in it, assuming command late in that campaign?
SW: The fate of Atlanta was, from a Confederate point of view, all but decided by Joe Johnston. Given that a Union army of approximately 100,000 men, of the degree of toughness and experience it possessed, commanded by a general of Sherman’s skill and resolution, was advancing toward Atlanta, it’s fall was probably certain by the time the Federals crossed the Chattahoochee. Hood was given a hopeless assignment.
CWG: So what do you do when you’re assigned to do the impossible but you are expected to make a serious attempt at it?
SW: Well, in the case of Hood at Atlanta, you can’t retreat, since any further retreat will give up the city at once. When an opposing army executes a turning maneuver (which any Civil War army could do to any other at any time–even Burnside did it to Lee) the army that is turned must either retreat or attack. (In the case of Burnside and Lee, Burnside was stalled by the absence of the pontoons so as to negate his turning maneuver and relieve Lee of the necessity either of retreating or of attacking.) Sherman was almost unequaled in his propensity and skill for turning maneuvers. When Sherman turned him, Hood could not retreat, and so had to attack. His plans were reasonably skillful, though making good plans is probably the least difficult of a commanding general’s duties.
CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Peachtree on July 20th, where Hood lost nearly 5,000 men?
SW: At Peachtree Creek he failed due to 1) his own physical inability to oversee the maneuver, 2) lack of adequate staff work (endemic to Confederate armies), and 3) Hardee’s apparent lack of cordial cooperation. Of course, the Confederates had at best an infinitessimally small margin of error at Peachtree Creek given who they were fighting against (Thomas)
CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Atlanta on July 22, where Hood lost 8,500 men?
SW: At the Battle of Atlanta Hood and his men did absolutely everything that should have been necessary to win a victory. Had they executed an attack like that one on Hooker and the Army of the Potomac at the time of Chancellorsville, I believe they would have won a victory at least as impressive. On the other hand, if Lee and Jackson and the Army of Northern Virginia could somehow have been transported through time and space to attack McPherson and Logan and the Army of the Tennessee at Atlanta, I believe the Federals would still have prevailed. The Army of the Tennessee was simply stout enough to withstand any blow the Confederates could conceivably have dealt, barring the presence of overwhelming Confederate numbers.
CWG: your evaluation of Hood at Ezra Church July 28 where 3,000 Confederate casualties took place?
SW: Ezra Church was of course an unmitigated flop–a complete fiasco from a Confederate point of view. It is attributable to a gross blunder by Stephen D. Lee and of course also to Hood’s own inability to oversee events personally and, perhaps, as well, to his lack of attention to detail.
CWG: and Jonesborough August 31st – Sept 1st?
SW: Jonesboro was much the same, as Ezra Church, in overall concept.
CWG: So your overall assessment og Hood in Atlanta would be?
SW: Therefore, my assessment of Hood’s performance in the Atlanta campaign is that he was 1) physically incapacitated by wounds from exercising fully effective command of a Confederate field army, and 2) possibly somewhat careless of details, as Lee had suggested.
CWG: let’s turn to Hood’s Tennessee campaign. Set the background up for us and place Hood in the reality he was facing.
SW: The Tennessee campaign is the same thing only more. What is a Confederate commander to do, in November 1864? Suppose you’re a Confederate army commander at that time. You’ve got to try something that at least seems to have a remote chance of saving the cause. What do you do? it’s hard to think of any course of action that could have won it for the Confederacy at that point. Would Jefferson Davis and Confederate public opinion have tolerated a passive policy of simply sitting down in front of Atlanta, poised to hinder Sherman’s advance farther into the interior of Georgia? Would they have insisted that Hood attempt to retake Atlanta?
CWG: Would the North Georgia policy, if pursued persistently, have yielded better results in the long run?
SW: Well, it would have piled up fewer casualties, but the end result would have been Union victory anyway. I’d say the worst criticism to which Hood is liable for the Tennessee campaign is that he acted out of desperation and failed about as spectacularly as is possible to imagine.
CWG: what responsibility should we lay at the feet of the Confederate political authorities?
SW: Maybe we should blame the Confederate political authorities for keeping their military fighting, throwing away lives by the thousand in utterly desperate gambits, when all rational hope of victory was past.
CWG: what significance or role did Franklin/Nashville have in the overall war effort for the South (for late 1864)?
SW: Franklin and Nashville had a limited impact on the overall course of the war simply because they failed to change anything. The Union controlled Tennessee before the campaign and controlled it even more solidly afterward. Confederate chances for success in the campaign were, from the outset, rather desperate. The impact of the battles was 1) to increase the overall Confederate death toll of the war, and 2) to remove whatever latent threat to Union control of Tennessee might have been posed by Hood’s army lurking in north Alabama. For example, it seems unlikely that Schofield’s two corps would have been shifted to the east coast if Hood, with an as yet unbroken Army of Tennessee, were still lurking just outside the state, threatening to move north.
And yet, would that have changed the outcome of the war? No, Sherman could have accomplished his purpose without Schofield, and the overall outcome would have been the same. Perhaps the crowning irony of the battles of Franklin and Nashville is that they were fought at a time when the war was already decided. by late November 1864 it is difficult to imagine any train of events that could have led to a Confederate victory.
Important quotes related to the Battle of Franklin:
When we got to the turnpike near Spring Hill, lo! and behold; wonder of wonders! the whole Yankee army had passed during the night. The bird had flown.
- Confederate Private Sam Watkins, 1st Tennessee Infantry
[Hood was] wrathy as a rattlesnake this morning, striking at everything.
- Confederate General John Brown to Maj. Vaulx of Cheatham’s staff, on the disposition of John Bell Hood on the morning of November 30th, upon learning that the Federals had escaped from Spring Hill in the early morning hours and had headed toward Franklin.
I have never seen more intense rage and profound disgust than was expressed by the weary, foot-sore, battle-torn Confederate soldiers when they discovered that their officers had allowed their prey to escape.
- Mississippian Rhett Thomas
The road was strewn everywhere with the wreck of thrown away stuff that they were unable to carry in their flight.
- Confederate Lt. Spencer B. Talley, 28th TN Infantry, describing what he saw along the Columbia Pike as the rebel army followed after the Union army into Franklin
To which Lt. William H. Berryhill, 43rd Miss., (CSA) added, the road was strewn with tents, knapsacks, dirty clothing, books, paper and a great many wagons were on fire.
Burnt wagons, dead pack animals, and tossed knapsacks all seemed to indicate a demoralized retreat, heartening the Southerners with thoughts of possible enemy capitulation and a quick victory.
Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.
If you prevent Hood from turning your position at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too much.
- George H. Thomas (c0mmander), to John M. Schofield, regarding how to proceed if an attack was to ensue at Franklin. Contrast this with Hood’s attack at-any-cost approach at Franklin.
I do no think the Federals will stand strong pressure from the front; the show of force they are making is a feint in order to hold me back from a more vigorous pursuit.
- General John Bell Hood to Nathan Bedford Forrest
General Hood, if you give me one strong division of infantry with my cavalry, I will agree to flank the Federals from their works within two hours’ time.
- Nathan Bedford Forrest to his commander Hood. Hood engaged two Corps at Franklin; Stewart’s and Cheathams. He did not even wait for Lee’s Corps or for his artillery to effectively engage in the enusing battle. Had he waited for Lee, he would have had three more divisions and could have supported Forrest in his request.
We will make the fight.
- General John Bell Hood to a subordinate officer after surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, just shortly before the battle began.
I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him in the Big Harpeth river at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road.
- Confederate commander of the Army of Tennessee, General John Bell Hood, quoted from Hood’s memoirs, written long after the battle.
I could easily see all the movements of the Federals and readily trace their line. I saw that they were well fortified and in a strong position. I felt that we would take a desperate chance if we attempted to dislodge them.
- Corps Commander, Major General Benjamin F. Cheatham, upon surveying the battlefield from Winstead Hill, two miles south of the Fedederal’s position in downtown Franklin.
If an assault was to be made by Hood, General Cleburne said it would be a terrible and useless waste of life.
- General Patrick R. Cleburne, Cheatham’s division, who would soon lose is own life during the assault.
General, I will take the works or fall in the effort.
- Patrick Cleburne to General John Bell Hood. leburne would fall, mortally wounded in attempting to take the works.
It was the grandest sight I ever saw when our army marched over the hill and reached the open field base. Each division unfolded itself into a single line of battle with as much steadiness as if forming for dress parade. . . The men wer etired, hungry, footsore, ragged, and many of them barefooted, but their spirit was admirable.
- James D. Porter, who served on Benjamin F. Cheatham’s staff.
The rebels had filled the plain to the south, sounding to all like “a tornado heralded by clouds of darkness and muttering thunders.”
I.G. Bennett and William M. Haigh, History of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, 1876, page 644; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 35.
General Cleburne seemed to be more despondent than I ever saw him. Iwas the last one to receive any instructions from him, and as I saluted and bade him good-bye I remarked, ‘Well General, there will not be many of us that will get back to Arkansas,’ to which he replied, “Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men.”
- Brigadier Daniel C. Govan to Cleburne, and Cleburne’s reply upon commenting just moments before the assault was ordered by Hood.
[Pick back up at page 270 in Jacobson]
We could see them [Confederate Generals on the field at a distance] casting doubting glances in the direction of the formidable foe in our front; and judging from the appearance of their grave and serious looks, we all knew that our commanders in some degree realized the dept of that yawning gulf of destruction which awaited them and us, and which only too soon would engulf us all.
- An unknown Confederate soldier; quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 37.
A profound silence pervaded the entire army; it was simply awful, reminding one of those sickening lulls which precede a tremendous thunderstorm.
- Confederate, John M. Copley, A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin, p. 48.
Go back, and tell them to fight like hell.
- Union General George Wagner instructing the courier to return to Wagner’s men on the frontline, who would take the initial blunt from Hood’s assault.
A tremendous deluge of shot and shell . . . seconded by a murderous sheet of fire and lead from the infantry behind the works, and also another battery of six guns directly in our front. It was, he said, a scene of carnage and destruction fearful to behold.
- A Mississippian survivor who faced the withering fire from Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank at the opening of the battle.
Great God! Do I command cowards?
- Confederate General William Loring, as he witnessed scores of his Mississippians running for their lives back toward the pike, after facing the initial onslaught of the fire from Casement’s and Stiles’ brigade on the Union left flank.
Never before did a command of the approximate strength of Casement’s in as short a period of time kill and wound as many.
- Union soldier, B.F. Thompson, 112th Illinois, in History; p. 277. Casement’s brigade was made up of 65th and 124th Indian, and the 65th Illinois.
Dam*ed Rebel sons of b_____es . . . . stand here like rocks, and whip the h___ out of them.
- John S. Casement, Union commander of the 2nd brigade
Regarding the violent clash between Opdycke’s men and pockets of Cleburne’s and Brown’s one survivor described the action as the contending elements of hell turned loose (so indelibly stamped that a) long life spent in peaceful pursuits will not suffice to erase or even dim them.
- A survivor of the 73rd Illinois regiment.
With no place to go and no place to hide, the Confederates mounted desperate attacks across the parapet – “as many as thirteen charges” according to one account – and the Federals lining the retrenchment methodically blasted them back. The space between the two gashes in the ground began to resemble a sepulchre, grotesquely lit by little more than gunfure blasts and artillery explosions. And in a particularly gruesome development, the men started building shelters out of the bodies of their comrades. All the while the nearly continuous fire from the gin house coursed through the huddled soldiers, exacting a bloody price with every sweep.
- Quoted in Patrick Brennan, The Battle of Franklin, North & South magazine, January 2005, Vol. 8., No.1: page 43; Regarding the fire General George Gordon’s Confederate troops experienced as they fought in front of the Cotton Gin.
I never saw men put in such a terrible position as Cleburne’s division for a few minutes. The wonder is that any of them escaped death or capture.
- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.
Heads, arms, and legs were sticking out in almost every conceivable manner . . . The air was filled with moans of the wounded.
- Capt. John Shellenberger, 50th Ohio, Union soldier.
It was impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers that November afternoon threw themsleves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. At some of the earthworks the press of men was so great that the dead having no place to fall, remained in an upright position.
- a Federal soldier, quoted in, The Battle of Franklin, M. Foster Farley, Civil War magazine; Summer 2006: p. 58.
Our loss of officers in the battle of Franklin on the 30th was excessively large in proportion to the loss of our men. The medical director reports a very large proportion of slightly wounded men.
- John Bell Hood, writing two days after the battle to Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon. The South lost 53 of 100 regimental commanders in the field at Franklin. Granbury’s brigade alone lost 70% of their regimental commanders. Undeterred, Hood would unmercilously throw his beleaguered Army of Tennessee against Thomas in another suicidal attack just two weeks later, effectively destroying his army. He would be replaced within weeks of the loss at Nashville, having led the Army of Tennesse for roughly six months.
With the loss of Tennessee in early 1862 – the capture and surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson (Feb 62) – the Union victory at Shiloh (April 62) , and the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863; the South’s Western Theater military strategy had zero margin for error by mid/late 1864.
In light of that background, John Bell Hood seems to have singlehandedly cost the war for the South, or the Western Theater, at the very least, due to his performance in the last six months of 1864, having assumed command of the Army of Tennessee on July 17th, 1864.
a. Hood lost Atlanta on his watch, even though he’d say Johnston lost it. But, Hood wreckless, fight at any cost attitude (having assumed command in mid July 1864) resulted in losing 20,000 men in nine days after he took the AoT over. Hood hastened the loss of Atlanta and then his loss of the supply train to the Federals only showed his strategy for Atlanta was an inch thick. He then over-estimated his ability to draw Sherman out into a fight in the open. Sherman was brilliant in Atlanta.
b. Hood saw some measure of success in the Eastern Theater as a Brigade commander but seems to have had an almost racial dislike for the soldier in the Western Theater. He seemed to think the ANV soldier was superior in essence to the Western Theater soldier.
c. His loss of his leg and arm (1863) probably caused him to over-compensate for being less a man, in his own mind. Then throw in his failure to win the love of Preston Buck and you have a man with mixed passions in 1864.
d. He was no mental heavyweight. He barely survived West Point. He clearly lacked strategic and logistical/administrative abilities. He was a good Brigade Commander because he did not have to execute on those higher levels. A fighter he was. Being able to translate the will and passion to fight in light of the ‘then’-modern technologies, strategies and challenges was another thing.
e. Hood’s propensity for direct frontal assaults was simply ridiculous. He seems to have interpreted using the steel bayonet as a more manly way to fight, combined with assaulting breastworks. Henry repeating rifles could fire off about 20-30 rounds a minute compared to the 3-minute minnie ball. To fail to take this into account at Franklin was beyond my imagination to allow him room for being anything but being virtually insane after the escape of the Federals at Spring Hill.
f. Hood’s losses from Atlanta were devastating to the AoT. Losing 20,000 men in nine days – for his army – would be like Sherman losing perhaps 3-4 times that number. What was he thinking? That he’d actually defeat Sherman by fighting and winning tactically?g. The Spring Hill situation really showed his weaknesses in many ways.
g. The Spring Hill situation really showed his weaknesses in many ways.
(1) His physical disabilities prevented him from being mobile and active enough to truely lead an army. His Division and Brigade commanders exhibited some of the bravest action in war at Franklin.
(2) How much did his opium-like medicine impair his ability?
(3) He was so disingenuous in his treatment of his commanders (especially after the war) in assigning blame for Spring Hill.
(4) The performance, or lack thereof, of his division commanders at Spring Hill are a direct reflection of Hood’s own poor logistical oversight. He seems to have very poorly understood the geography of the region.
(5) His lack of and poor administration of Forrest at Spring Hill/Franklin is mysterious.The assault upon the Federals at Franklin displays Hood’s total ineptitude as a commander of an Army. Why?
The assault upon the Federals at Franklin displays Hood’s total ineptitude as a commander of an Army. Why?
1). Did he actually think he could destroy Schofield at Franklin by using just two of his three Corps and mostly not engaging his own artillery?
2). Hood really thought these AoT troops lacked the courage to assault defended breastworks. The Union – at Franklin – had the advantage of strategically placed artillery, defended breastworks, the choice of location to fight, abatis, superior numbers, superior equipment, men who were not nearly as hungry, etc.
3). He marched across two miles of open ground before his corps reached the breastworks. It was more insane than Pickett’s Charge, with a greater loss of life too.
4). His inability to size up the situation, post-battle at Franklin, also reveals he did not deserve such authority he was given. To go after Thomas two weeks later was even more insane. At Franklin, Hood lost at least 1,700 in death and nearly 5,000 in wounded, captured or missing.
5). Had Wagner’s troops not been left out in the open to take the initial beating, then having to run for their lives, resulting in the Federals not being able to shoot the Confederates, the loss of life of Hood’s men would have been even much worse.
Hood fought (late 1864) from a mixture of motives and demons that cost tens of thousands of lives. He had to prove to himself, Davis, and Buck Preston he was a real man; probably to his father as well. Not to mention proving his worthiness to the likes of Lee, Hardee, Johnston, Richard Taylor, and Stonewall Jackson. I think he was intimated by the likes of Cleburne and A.P. Stewart. He was a man of highly questionable integrity and character, as he showed in “reporting” on Johnston during Atlanta.
John Bell Hood got his time in the spotlight from July until December 1864 and the reality is that he was an abysmal failure as a commander of an army.
What a lesson?
When one is finally in a position of authority, one must be ready to execute from the foundation of a character molded in integrity, courage, and capability – birthed in humility. Anything less will reveal the deeply hidden or masked flaws of one’s character in the heat of battle.
![Reblog this post [with Zemanta]](http://img.zemanta.com/reblog_e.png?x-id=6cb862a1-9fea-45c1-84c9-df7fd3f1bcb3)
CWG: When did the Federal income tax on personal income begin?
The Federal income tax on personal income began during the Civil War in 1861 during Abraham Lincoln’s administration. It violated the Constitution and was struck down at war’s end.
CWG: What percent in Federal tax revenue did Confederate states account for just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War (circa 1860)?
The Confederate states made up 87% of the tax revenue of the Federal treasury in 1860.
CWG: What was the primary form Federal taxes assumed just prior to the Civil War?
Before the War broke out Federal taxes were mostly in the form of excise taxes and tariffs (import taxes). Tariffs provided most of the Federal revenue in the form of taxes.
CWG: Why did Northern states use import taxes during the Civil War?
Northern states used import taxes as a way to protect their own manufacturers against Great Britain and other overseas competition. Northern imports brought in very little taxes for the government.
CWG: How did import taxes impact the South during the Civil War?
Unlike the North, the Southern states’ primary staple was King Cotton. The South depended heavily upon exporting cotton to overseas markets. Unlike the North, the South was an export-oriented economy. Thus import taxes on Southern cotton contributed greatly to the Federal tax revenue.
CWG: Since the North could not depend on revenues brought in from exported goods (i.e., cotton), how did the North generate revenue internally?
The North resorted to taxing it’s citizenry on such items as tobacco, alcohol, clothing, food stuffs, stamps, tools and even entertainment. The newly created Department of Internal Revenue (DIR) collected the taxes. Personal evasion of taxes was a common problem for the DIR.
CWG: What percent did taxes cover for the Civil War expenses of the North?
Taxes paid for roughly one-fifth of the North’s daily war efforts.
CWG: Where did the rest (i.e., four-fifths) of the money come from for the North?
It came from such forms as the creation of paper money, bonds and borrowing, This led to rampant inflation for the Northern economy due to an excessive proliferation of money.
CWG: How much did inflation affect the North from 1861-1865?
During the Civil War the cost of goods and services increased by 80% for the Northern states.
CWG: How much did inflation affect the South from 1861-1865?
During the Civil War the cost of goods and services increased by 60-70 times for the Southern states.
CWG: How much did it cost the North to wage Civil War on a daily basis?
About $1.75 million dollars was needed every day by the North to conduct its affairs on the military front, according to Anderson. Stevens says it was costing the North $2.5 million a day by the spring of 1863 (p. 106).
CWG: Prior to the changes in 1863 in bank charters, what kind of money or currency was in circulation in the United States?
There were many different forms of money in circulation prior to 1863, including private bank notes, government-minted gold and silver coins, Spanish dollars, and even private coins. There were as many as 1,500 different institutions issuing private bank notes. Private notes undermined the value of the Federal currency. They were printed in a variety of sizes, styles and denominations, thus making even simple transaction difficult to execute.
CWG: What did the Legal Tender Act of 1862 accomplish?
The Legal Tender Act of 1862 effectively outlawed privately minted gold and silver coins, and authorized the Federal Government to issue paper currency. It was printed with green ink on the back and thus became known as greenbacks. They were unbacked by gold and silver.
The government issued $500 million worth of bank notes during the war. By the end of the war, inflation having taken its toll, these same bank notes decreased in value by 61%.
CWG: How did the government use bonds to finance the Civil War?
At the beginning of 1863 the government relied heavily upon the sale of “five twenties” (six percent bonds, callable in five years and maturing in twenty). However, the demand for war bonds was unpredictable. They would rise and fall based on the military successes of failures of the North.
The government issued five kinds of paper currency during the war. For more information on the kinds of paper currency the North printed during the war see: http://www.financialhistory.org/civilwar/1861-1865/north/currency.htm
CWG: What were the first coins minted with the motto “In God we Trust” on them?
The Union 2-Cent pieces were the first U.S. coins minted with the motto, In God we Trust. These coins were bronze and were available from 1864-1865 during the war and actually up to 1873 after the war. They depict images of a shield, and eagle and a laurel sprig.
CWG: How were stamps used as “currency” during the Civil War?
Due to short supply of coins in the North, the government issued un-gummed stamps that could also be used as coinage.
CWG: Why did the Federal government stop minting coins after the Civil War began?
Facing a probable long war, the North decided to stop issuing coins and turned too printing paper money (i.e., greenbacks). As a result, many northerners panicked and started hoarding coins. Before long, most coins were no longer in circulation.
CWG: How did the Government respond to the crisis of coins being hoarded?
In response to the crisis, the Federal government issued fractional paper currency in denominations of 3, 5, 10, 15, 25, and 50 cents. These became known as shinplasters. People did eventually accept them as substitutes for metal coinage. The government stopped issuing fraction currency in 1876. By then $368 million worth of it made it into the private sector.
CWG: Did the South use similar means, as the North to finance the war effort (e.g., bonds, taxes and loans)?
In contrast with the North, the South primarily depended on paper currency to finance the war. As a result, inflation impacted the South even more since this currency was not backed by silver or gold. Currency was printed from 1861-1864. In 1861, when Confederate currency was first printed, it was worth 95 cents on the U.S. dollar. By 1863 they were trading at just 33 cents on the dollar. By April 9, 1965, at the war’s end, a Confederate dollar traded at just 1.6 cents on the dollar. On May 1, 1865 Confederate dollar bills were sold in bales of 1,200 notes for just $1 U.S. dollar.
CWG: How much currency was printed by the Southern government?
More than $1 billion was in circulation during the Civil War. Unfortunately, as much as $1.5 billion was printed in counterfeit Confederate currency. The North encouraged and promoted the counterfeiting of Confederate currency since it devalued the value of it.
CWG: What are some examples of paper denominational amounts that were printed by the South?
Confederate banknotes were printed in blue-gray color and became known as bluebacks. They were available in the following denominations: 5 cent note, 10 cent note, 15 cent note, 25 cent note, 50 cent note, $1 note, $1.75 note, $2 note, $3 note, $5 note, $10 note, $20 note, $50 note and $100 notes. $10 notes were the most widely printed note.
CWG: Were coins minted by the Confederacy?
Yes, coins were minted by the Confederacy but they were very rare, Experimental pennies (copper or silver, 1861) and half-dollars (silver, 1861) were minted by the South. Examples: .1 cent coin, .50 cent coin, $5 dollar coin.
CWG: What are some examples of paper denomination amounts that were printed by the Federal Government?
3 cent note, 5 cent note, 10 cent note, 25 cent note, $1 dollar note, $1, $2 dollar note, $5 dollar note, $10 dollar note, $50 dollar note
CWG: What kind of scenes did the South depict slaves on their printed currency?
Among the myriad of scenes depicting slave labor we find the following categories of images on printed currency: Individuals With Cotton Individuals With Assorted Tasks, Field Scenes Stylistic Scenes, Post Civil War Scenes, Sugar Plantations and Transportation. For more information see “Beyond Face Value” on the Web.
Letter by Adjutant John Andrews Fox of the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry to childhood friend William following the fall of Atlanta.
Head Quarters
Port Atlanta Ga
Oct. 26th 1864
William,
Our communications had been cut for about twenty days. I can assure you the excitement caused by the receipt of home letters was intense – not being either married or bespoken I took the matter philosophically though I confess to a certain amount of grim satisfaction.
I have been somewhat apprehensive lest you friends at home might worry during the blockade and conjure up horrid pictures of starvation or mule steak diet. T’ain’t so. We never lived better and we have as little idea of evacuating the place as we have of starving with plenty of forage within reach. You be sure the secesh widows and fatherless don’t like it, just let them leave alone our railroad. Our last raid brought us a pig, ten chickens, three barrels flour, six bushels, sweet potatoes, one keg syrup, corn meal, honey, beets, apples, dried peaches, etc. If this is staring famine in the face I can gaze calmly on its linearments for some days.
Found on Nate Sander’s auction web site: 12/24/06 Item #2410
Note:
- Shows the success of Union army living off the land during Atlanta campaign
- At the time of this letter, the 2nd Mass., was part of the Dept of the Army of Ohio and Cumberland
Pulaski, Tenn. / November 20th 1864
reads in part,
An old ‘darky’ in ‘Alabam’ said (one day as we were passing a plantation where about ‘five thousand’ were congregated along the road side – one of the boys asked him what he thought of the music (our band was playing) – his answer was ‘dunno, sah, but pears like tis getting mity glorious Shuah’ – it pears like the election news from Sherman,’ begin to make things look ‘mity glorious’ for the Union cause. As the particulars are brought out – the frauds on the part of the copperheads - their total everlasting defeat, it surely is encouraging to all at least sanguine can take hope the end is nigh.
Since the 4th of last month [Oct 4th] we have marched on foot about 300 miles – rode on the cars from Dalton, Ga. to down 40 miles south of Nashville from where we marched to this place making a distance of 15 miles from Nashville south. Hood with his rebel troops is supposed to be on the southern shore of the Tenn. River making an attempt to get into East Tenn. I hardly think he will win for we have the army of the Cumberland and Ohio here to whip him in case he wishes to fight or make a forward movement”
********************************************
Found on Nate Sanders auction site 12/24/06 Lot #2201 Item#20975
Notes:
- Soldier’s identity not yet determined
- Says that since the 4th of “last month” (probably October) his regiment has marched 300 miles.
- Timing of letter (i.e., October 4th 1864) starts the Nashville-Atlanta Campaign: Allatoona (Oct5), Decatur (Oct 26-29), and Johnsonville (Nov 4-5).
- Mentions defeat of the Copperheads in 1864 general election, refers to Sherman.
- Talks about how John Bell Hood’s interest if for East Tennesse.
- Says the Army of the Ohio and Cumberland are ready to whip Hood if he goes after Tennessee.
- This letter is written just ten days before the Battle of Franklin
Civil War Record of T.J. Williams
Transcribed from scan of originals by Kraig McNutt
December 2006
[page one]
War record of T.J. Williams who enlisted in Co D 120th Indiana Volunteer Infantry on the 10th day of November 1863 to serve 3 years or during the war.
We was located at Vincennes, Indiana in Old Camp Knox where our Regiment was organized.
We for three months was engaged in drilling and recruiting and preparing for the front. And during this time occurred the coldest New Year’s day and Eve.
So I was at home on a furlough first day of January 1864 and walked home to Princeton, Indiana. Returning to my Regiment, it was so cold quite a lot of chickens, hogs and sheep froze to death. Also one man froze at Camp Knox.
The first week of January 1864 we got our war equipments and our guns and started for the South. Went to Louisville, Ky was there only for a short time, then we marched to Nashville, TN. Was there only a short time and we marched from there to the front and went into the fight in good earnest on what is known as the Atlanta and Georgia campaign and for 60 days we was in a fight all the way from Nashville to the fall of Atlanta.
[page 2]
We was in a fight all summer at Big Shanty, Marietta and nearly all the stations along the Southern road to Atlanta. Some of the hardest fight was Columbia and Kingston, when Columbus Benson was shot and killed and Eliant [Eli] Briant was wounded. Lost several men at the Battle of Franklin.
So after Lee surrendered to Grant we moved into Raleigh, North Carolina, and thought we would soon be discharged and sent home. But lo and behold ordres came we had to stay until everything was settled up and we stayed there till 8th day of June 1866.
I was placed on guard at Gov. Vance’s residence, and in a short time we received word that President Lincoln was assassinated, and one of the most exciting times I ever saw, had to guard the town of Raleigh to keep soldiers from firing and burning it to ashes.
A few things I [will] never forget while in the service, at one time not engaged in battle, quite a number of the Boys was playing cards, having what they term a good time. All of a sudden we heard firing off to the right and the boom of cannon off to the left and officers riding back and forth, and we was soon in line and marching to the firing line where we hear we would have to face death. So the Boys began to throw away their cards. No one wanted to be killed with a deck of cards in his pocket. But I never saw a Testament thrown away during a battle.
A few outstanding events I ____services in the Civil [War], “One was the surrender of Gen Lee to Gen Grant on the march to Atlanta, Georgia. We stopped on Old Farm to eat dinner, had all eat and was sitting around waiting orders. Saw the Orderly riding his horse to Headquarters then Division Headquarters, hence to Brigade Headquarters, and Regimental Headquarters with orders that Lee had surrendered to Sam Grant, and of all the ______ that took place on that old farm.
[page 4]
The Boys shouted and yelled themselves hoarse, and some one set fire to a Turpentine Distillery and the blaze almost went to the sky. Then from there we moved in to Raleigh North Carolina. Took charge of all the government surplus. While there I was called to go to Richmond, Virginia. Was a guard for Gen Terry. I had a very pleasant trip. Went all over Richmond, also through Old Libby Prison where they kept our prisoners during the war. It was a shame a rough looking place. So we passed the summer of 1865 at Raleigh N.C., dispensing of government property, and finally on the 8th day of January 1866 we was discharged and sent home. One of the darkest places on earth. So ended my service in the Civil War and it was only through the goodness of God that I got through and got home.
TJ Williams
