Daily Archive

Southern Historical Society Papers.
Vol. XVI. Richmond, Va., January-December. 1888.
B. F. Cheatham, Major-General C. S. A.

A Tribute to his Memory by Bishop C. T. QUINTARD.
[Read by Captain J. J. Crusman at a reunion of Confederate veterans, held at Clarksville, Tennessee, October 3, 1888.]

To POLK G. JOHNSON, Esq., Clarksville:

MY DEAR FRIEND–I have delayed my reply to your last kind letter in order that I might say definitely whether it would be possible for me to join you at the grand gathering on the 4th of October. To my very great regret I am obliged to decline your generous hospitality. My pressing official duties will oblige me to be in a distant part of the State on the 4th. I greatly regret this, as I am most anxious to meet the members of Forbes’ Bivouac, of which I am rejoiced to be a member. Then, too, I wished to attend the meeting that I might embrace the occasion to pay some fitting tribute to my dear friend, that true man and grand soldier, the late Major-General B. F. Cheatham. During and after the war I was brought into such intimate association with him that I learned to appreciate his high character. He was a man of admirable presence. In manners he was free without frivolity–cheerful, kind-hearted and ever easy of access. He was a gentleman without pretension, and a politician without deceit; a faithful friend and a generous foe; strong in his attachments and rational in his resentments. He was clear in judgment, firm in purpose, and courageous as a lion. He was faithful in expedients, prompt in action, and always ready for a fight. He won victory on many a well-contested field; but, best of all, he ruled his own spirit.

Born in Davidson county in the year 1819, he was brought up upon his father’s farm; accustomed to work from his boyhood, he was never ashamed of it after he became a man.

In 1846 he went to Mexico as captain of a company in the First Tennessee regiment. With this company he fought at Monterey, and there first attracted marked attention for his promptness, skill and daring courage. His regiment, foremost amongst the bravest, baptized in its own blood, came forth from the conflict the “Bloody First,” a cognomen significant of its fearful christening. After the battle, Captain Cheatham volunteered, with characteristic courage and humanity, to remain and bring in the wounded who, during the long and arduous conflict of the day, lay where they had fallen on the field. With his regiment he had participated in the preceding battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. After the time for which his company had enlisted had expired, he returned to Nashville and raised a regiment, of which he was made colonel by acclamation. On reaching Vera Cruz as senior colonel, he had command of a brigade and joined General Scott on his march to the capital of the country. He participated in nearly all the battles around the City of Mexico.

The late war found him engaged in the peaceful pursuits of agriculture. In May, 1861, he was made a brigadier-general of the Confederate army, and was sent to the assistance of General Pillow at New Madrid. He remained with the army in Missouri till it crossed over to Tennessee and Kentucky; repulsed the Federal gunboats, Lexington and Conestoga, in the first naval engagement on the Mississippi; rallied our scattered troops at Belmont, attacking the enemy in flank and putting them to flight, and pursuing the fugitives to their gunboats. At the battle of Shiloh he was under fire, with his command, all the first day on the extreme right and, till after two o’clock of the second day, the extreme left. Here he received his well-merited commission as major-general of the Confederate States army, bearing date March, 1862. In the Kentucky campaign he led the van of the right wing, and at the battle of Perryville his division bore the brunt of the conflict and won brilliant honors. During the battle he rode along the lines, through an incessant shower of shot and shell, calmly smoking his pipe, and breathing the very soul of chivalry and enthusiasm into his men.

That day he captured three or four batteries. Lieutenant-General Polk, in his report of the battle of Perryville, says: “To Major. Generals Hardee and Cheatham I feel under obligations for the judgment and skill manifested in conducting the operations of their respective commands, and for the energy and vigor with which they directed their movements. Few instances are on record where such successes have been obtained against such disparity of numbers.”

At Murfreesboro, in the two actions of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, and during all of Hood’s campaign, and on many a field beside, he exhibited the most perfect self-possession, the utmost disregard of peril, the sublimest enthusiasm of heroic battle; while in the disposition and management of his forces he united the discernment of the commander to the ardor of the soldier. Wherever he appeared he gave a new zest to the conflict and a new impulse to victory. On Hood’s campaign it has been charged that Cheatham failed to give battle when the “enemy was marching along the road almost under the camp-fires of the main body of the army.” It is sufficient to say that Cheatham possessed in an eminent degree that indispensable quality of a soldier which enabled him to go wherever duty or necessity demanded his presence. He understood thoroughly that it was better that a leader should lose his life than his honor; and we may believe his statement that “during my services as a soldier under the flag of my country in Mexico, and as an officer of the Confederate armies, I cannot recall an instance where I failed to obey an order literally, promptly and faithfully.” We may accept the statement of Major D. W. Saunders, A. A. G., of French’s division. “The assumption that Scofield’s army would have been destroyed at Spring Hill, and one of the most brilliant victories of the war achieved had it not been for the misconduct of Cheatham, is one of the delusions that has survived the war. No circumstance or incident that his strategy developed can be found that justifies Hood’s attack on the military reputation of General Cheatham.” The truth is plainly brought out in the letter of Governor Isham G. Harris, addressed to Governor James D. Porter:

Governor JAMES D. PORTER:

DEAR SIR– * * * General Hood, on the march to Franklin, spoke to me, in the presence of Major Mason, of the failure of General Cheatham to make the right attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for his disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked that General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter last night. “I did not send him the order!” I asked him if he had communicated the fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that “it is due General Cheatham that this explanation should be made!” Thereupon Major Mason joined General Hood and gave him the information. Afterward General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me to inform him that “he held him blameless” for the failure at Spring Hill; and on the day following the battle of Franklin I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham assuring him that he did not censure him with the failure to attack.

Very respectfully,

ISHAM G. HARRIS.

Memphis, Tenn., May 20, 1877.

The communication referred to in the letter of Governor Harris was received by General Cheatham, and was read by Governor Harris, General Porter, Major Cummins, of Georgia, and Colonel John C. Burch; but General Cheatham, as he says, “not having been in the habit of carrying a certificate of military character,” attached no special value to the paper, and lost it during the campaign in North Carolina.

The story of his military career is yet to be written, and this Commonwealth of Tennessee will have no brighter page in its history. I must write briefly of the close of the great chieftain’s life.

On the 23d of January, 1866, it was my privilege to receive him by Holy Baptism into the church. On the 15th of March following, I officiated at his marriage to Anna Robertson. Subsequently they both renewed the vows of Holy Baptism in the Rite of Confirmation.  I gave them their first communion. I was with the General the week before his death,

“When subtle pain
Wrung his sad soul and racked his throbbing brain,
When weary life, breathing reluctant breath,
Had no hope sweeter than the hope of death.”

And in that solemn hour when the battle was fought out, and the weary hinting soldier felt that the sword and shield were slipping from his stiffening hand, I gave him the most comfortable sacrament of the body and blood of his Saviour, and his lips breathed out his trust in his dear Redeemer.

I officiated at his funeral, at the request of his family taking the entire service both at the church and at the grave.

He was a great and a good man; he was great wherever duty called, whether on the battlefield or in the walks of private life. “I have never seen the day,” said Judge John Lawrence, an ex-Confederate soldier, “when I did not want to take off my hat to the great man and hold his honest hand.” He was as brave as the spotless Bayard, and as chivalrous as Philip Sidney.

I have written this sketch hastily, and with few records from which to gather the facts, but the writing has brought before my mind a thousand sad, though sacred memories–recollections of the dear boys of the First Tennessee regiment, whose Chaplain I was, of officers and men with whom I was associated during all the war. Many have gone to their rest, the young have grown old, but ever fresh and green will their memory remain in my soul. I cannot better close than by quoting the following poem by the late General Charles G. Halpine, of the Federal army:

There are bonds of all sorts in this world of ours,
Fetters of friendship and ties of flowers,
And true lovers’ knots I ween;
The girl and the boy are bound by a kiss.
But there’s never a bond, old friend, like this–
We have drunk from the same canteen!
It was sometimes water, and sometimes milk,
And sometimes applejack, fine as silk,
But whatever the tipple has been,
We shared it together, in bane or bliss,
And I warm to you, friend, when I think of this–
We drank from the same canteen!
The rich and the great sit down to dine,
And they quaff to each other in sparkling wine,
From glasses of crystal and green;
But I guess in their golden potations they miss
The warmth of regard to be found in this–
We have drunk from the same canteen!
We have shared our blankets and tents together,
And have marched and fought in all kinds of weather,
And hungry and full we have been;
Had days of battle and days of rest,
But this memory I cling to and love the best–
We have drunk from the same canteen!

I beg you to make my cordial salutations to the members o! Forbes’ Bivouac and to my friends generally.

I am, very faithfully yours,

CHARLES TODD QUINTARD.

Fulford Hall, Sewanee, Tenn., September 28, 1888.

Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol IX.  Richmond, Va., Oct., Nov And Dec., 1881. Nos. 10, 11 & 12.
Reminicences Of Hood’s Tennessee Campaign.

By Captain W.O. Dodd,

(The following is also one of the valuable series of papers read before the Louisville Branch of the Southern Historical Society)

It is my purpose to give only personal observation and experience of the important movement of the Western armies in the fall and winter of 1864. The advance of General Hood on Nashville was the last important movement in the West during the war.

In the summer of 1864 General Sherman, with a large and victorious army, occupied Atlanta, the very centre of the Confederacy. General Johnston had been removed, causing much dissatisfaction both in military and civil life, and General Hood placed in command, whose patriotism and courage were recognized by all, but whose ability to command the entire army was much questioned.

It had been demonstrated that Gen. Hood must either be reinforced or retreat before the advancing columns of Sherman.

Reinforcements could not be supplied, and an emergency had to be met. General Thomas commanded a large force in Tennessee, which was protecting Sherman’s rear and guarding his lines of communication and supplies. Should Sherman advance southward from Atlanta with Hood in front, Thomas could easily overrun Alabama and capture Selma, Montgomery and Mobile.

It was determined to throw Hood’s army in the rear of Sherman and destroy the railroad, hoping thereby to draw Sherman out, leaving a  portion of his army in Atlanta, and give Hood an opportunity of fighting him in detail. The movement was made, and in the main successful, except no opportunity was given for engaging Sherman’s forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood’s army into Tennessee and destroy Thomas and then take possession of Kentucky and threaten Ohio.

The conception was a bold one. Its execution involved leaving a large Federal army in Georgia, which could march unobstructed to the sea, cutting again in twain the Confederacy, or it would move back and join Thomas, securing the destruction of Hood. It was at first determined to cross the Tennessee river above Decatur, but Forrest was near Jackson, Tennessee, and unacquainted with the plan of campaign, and on account of the swollen condition of the Tennessee river could not cross below Florence.

So it was determined to cross the entire army at that point, and as soon as our commander (Forrest) received orders we hastened to Tuscumbia, where we joined Hood’s army. Some delay was occasioned in repairing the Memphis and Charleston railroad so as to bring sufficient supplies for the expedition. The country is poor from Florence northward until you reach the neighborhood of Pulaski and Mount Pleasant, and we were required to take sufficient forage to last until we could reach the fertile country of Middle Tennessee.

Our division, commanded by General Chalmers, covered the left of the army, and about the 19th of November, 1864, the army was put in motion.

General Hood commanded the expedition, with three army corps of infantry commanded by Generals Stewart, S.D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. The entire force numbered about thirty thousand. It was as gallant an army as ever any Captain commanded. The long march from Atlanta had caused the timid and sick to be left behind, and every man remaining was a veteran. Then the long and sad experience of retreating was now reversed, and we were going to redeem Tennessee and Kentucky, and the morale of the army was excellent.

We hoped to cut off a large body of Federals at Pulaski, but by a forced march they got into Columbia just in time to prevent capture. On the 27th of November we formed around Columbia, the two wings of the army resting on Duck river, Cheatham being to the right.

General Schofield retired to the north side of Duck river, and an artillery fire was kept up daring the 28th. General Hood supposed Schofield would remain a day or two on the opposite side of the river, <shv9_520> which could not easily be crossed under the fire of Schofield’s guns. So he concluded to leave General Lee, with two divisions at Columbia, who was ordered to make demonstrations as if to cross the river, while he would cross the river a few miles above, and intercept the rear of Schofield at Spring Hill, twelve miles in rear, on the Franklin pike. Our command moved up and crossed the river (fording it) on the evening of the 28th, about eight miles from Columbia, and early next morning made a detour through a rough country, skirmishing most of the time until, shortly after noon, we reached the beautiful country near Spring Hill.

I remember distinctly the beautiful day, and as we got in sight of the little village of Spring Hill the old rugged veterans of Cheatham’s corps came marching up on our left with their battle flags waving in the mellow sunlight, and we felt., that a long sought opportunity had at last arrived. Lee’s guns at Columbia kept up lively music, admonishing us that he was meeting his part of the contract. We were satisfied that a few minutes — at most an hour — would be ample time in which to place our command across the pike, and then the surrender of Schofield would follow as night follows day. The command under Hood had crossed the river that morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps. We had but little artillery, as the roads were too rough for moving it.

It was about 3 or 4 o’clock when everything was ready to advance. Every soldier realized that we would have a fight, but the result was not a question. The Federals only had one division at Spring Hill, numbering about four thousand men, while we had two corps and a division of infantry and the greater part of Forrest’s cavalry. Our force was fully sixteen thousand men, and I think nearer twenty thousand, and it was a fair open field fight. It was said at the time, and I have always believed it to be true, that General Forrest asked permission to place his command across the pike, but was refused.

Cheatham’s corps was put forward and deployed as if they were going to do all the work and have all the glory. I remember how anxiously we sat on our horses on a hillside overlooking the fertile fields around Spring Hill, and expected, in vain, to at least see the battle. But alas! night came on and we went into camp, at first cautioned not to make fires, but in a little time were asleep before good fires, having plenty of forage for our horses from the adjoining fields. General Schofield was permitted to march by that night without firing a gun, and the great and only opportunity of the campaign was lost.

Who was to blame for the blunder?

No one accuses either General Stewart or Forrest of being in any way responsible. It was either the fault of General Hood or of General Cheatham, in my opinion both were to blame, but the principal fault is at the door of General Cheatham. In giving this opinion, I know some gentlemen present whose opinions are entitled to more weight than mine, will differ with me, and I invite the fullest criticism, hoping thereby to get at the real truth of history. I know it was stated on the field on that ill fated day that General Cheatham was ordered by General Hood to take Spring Hill and cut off Schofield, every necessary support being promised him, and that he did not do it. His command was in advance, and naturally he would bring on the engagement. It was not denied at the time by Cheatham’s friends that he received such orders. It subsequently appeared in the newspapers of the South, and he was charged with being responsible for the fatal mistake, and I have never seen or heard of a denial from him. Finally, General Hood, in his book, “Advance and Retreat,” charges the calamity on Cheatham, and brings forward strong corroborating testimony to support it, and so far as I know, General Cheatham has never denied it, or in any way questioned the correctness of General Hood’s statements. But I do not think Cheatham alone to blame. The General commanding the armies was on the ground and in sight of the pike, and could clearly see the Federals retreating in confusion, and the position was such that he could not but know what Cheatham was doing. There was plenty of time, and he could have seen the order executed before dark. Again, General Hood intimates that the soldiers were unwilling to fight except behind breastworks. Those who witnessed the battle of Franklin on the next day will not allow such an imputation to be made.

Even after dark there would have been no material trouble in crossing the pike. General Hood says it got dark about 4 o’clock, which is not correct; and then he says there were so many shade trees that darkness was hastened and increased from that cause. It was a clear day and a starlight night, and while there were quite a number of trees just around Spring Hill, the battle would have been largely in a corn field and an open piece of woodland. Schofield’s command did not reach Spring Hill until 11 o’clock at night, and it would have been an easy matter to rout them even at that hour. A soldier has a mortal dread of the enemy in the rear. But — we slept, and the Federals marched by without molestation. As I said before, there was not a soldier who did not realize that a golden opportunity was at hand, and every one felt mortified at the inglorious result. We lost confidence in General Hood, not that we doubted his courage, but we clearly saw that his capacities better suited him to command a division. This whole thing was a wretched affair, let the fault be wherever it may.

It reminded me more of the death of General Albert Sidney Johnston on the battlefield at Shiloh than any other event of the war. No one doubts but that his death prevented the destruction of Grant’s army, and a victory such as his life guaranteed on that eventful April day would have produced results such as imagination can hardly picture. So, if we had captured Schofield, as could easily have been done at a trifling loss, we would have taken Nashville without a battle and pushed on into Kentucky, and, while I do not claim that it would have changed the result, yet it would certainly have prolonged the war and thrown an uncertain factor into the great problem.

It seemed then, as it looks now as we glance back over the scene, that a hand stronger than armies had decreed our overthrow.

On the following morning, at the dawn of day, we were in our saddles, and pushed on after Schofield’s command, which was rapidly hastening to Franklin. Our division crossed over to the extreme left and approached Franklin over the Carter’s creek pike, and about 3 o’clock P.M. we were on the high range of hills just south of Franklin and overlooking the town. The Federal army was in line of battle in front of the town, and we had a fine view of the situation.

The soldiers were in fine fighting trim, as they felt chagrined and mortified at the occurrence of the preceding day, and each man felt a pride in wiping out the stain caused by a superior’s fault. I will not undertake to picture or in any way describe the battle that was fought in the old field near a gin house in front of Franklin, that memorable afternoon and evening. No man who took part in it or witnessed it can help being proud of American soldiery. The battle lasted until long after dark, and the two armies at some points came to hand to hand contest.

Our artillery was not much used, but the enemy used one battery, situated in a locust grove, with great effect. I do not believe there was any battle of the war to compare to it in severity, considering the number engaged and the time it lasted. The principal destruction was about sundown and a little later.

Soon after night the Federals commenced retreating, and about one o’clock in the morning I went with the advance into town. As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were gone, I made a torch and went over the battlefield. To those unaccustomed to such things, no description can give an idea of the sight. The dead were literally piled up, and to my sorrow I saw that our loss was much the greatest. We had pressed them into their last line, and there the dead lay mangled together. Entire companies were literally gone. And just a little back the gallant old soldier, General Pat Cleburne, lay dead. He was the idol of his command, and a better soldier never died for any cause. Brigadier General Adams was killed, he and his horse falling together, just on the earthworks of the enemy. Our loss was about 5,000 men including five Generals killed and six wounded.

I could not but feel that the lives of these men were a useless sacrifice. It seemed to me to be a rashness occasioned by the blunder of the day before. It was an attempt to make good by reckless daring the blunder which incapacity had occasioned the preceding day. Schofield had as many or more men in Franklin than we had. He was gathering strength from all quarters as he fell back, while we were losing.

The next morning we should have buried our dead, and those of the enemy, and retired from the State. While we held the battlefield, and the dead of our adversaries, we were disheartened and demoralized. We had witnessed on one day a brilliant flank movement terminate by lying down by the roadside in order to let the enemy pass by, and on the next day saw the army led out in a slaughter pen to be shot down like animals. Soldiers are quick to perceive blunders, and when confidence is destroyed in a superior officer he should be removed. There is nothing so wholesome with a good soldier as perfect confidence in the courage and judgment of superior officers. While the majority of the army believed General Cheatham mainly responsible for the misfortune at Spring Hill, yet General Hood did not escape censure. And when at Franklin the attempt was made to do by storm against an entrenched and reinforced foe, what strategy failed to do the day before, the morale of the army was almost destroyed.

But instead of retreating at once and saving the remnant of a magnificent army, we moved up and formed around Nashville. Our little army, now about 23,000 strong, was stretched for miles around the city. We were on the extreme left, near the Cumberland river, and were not strong enough to make a good picket line. The rout and retreat were inevitable. Thomas accumulated an army of 82,000. The only wonder is that he did not capture us all. General Walthall, one of the bravest and best of all our gallant army, with a picked command, and aided by Forrest, covered the retreat and enabled us to get out with 18,000 men. We recrossed the Tennessee river on the 26th and 27th days of December.The campaign would have been brilliant and successful but for the fatal action or inaction at Spring Hill.

I am well aware that we can look back after events have occurred and detect errors which it seems reasonable prudence would have avoided; but I have never seen more clearly the opportunity and the error than on the 29th day of November, 1864.

What stirring events were then happening! Sherman started on his march to the sea about the same day Hood started to the North. In quick succession reverse after reverse came to our arms until, suddenly, the whole structure crumbled and fell to the ground.

Death has drawn his cold mantle over the brave Hood, but he left his version of the unfortunate period about which I have written, and my own conviction is that in the main his story is true.

General Cheatham is still living, and surely if General Hood is wrong the truth of history demands that he speak.

If what has been written should provoke those familiar with the facts to tell their version I shall be more than paid.

Headquarters Stevenson’s Division,
In the field - January 20th, 1865.

Major, — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division during the recent campaign in Tennessee:

The march from Palmetto to the front of Columbia was without incident worthy of mention, except, perhaps, the demonstration upon Resaca, Georgia, in which my command acted with spirit in the skirmishing which resulted in driving the enemy within their works. My loss was numerically insignificant at this point, but amongst the killed was numbered the gallant soldier and genial gentleman, Colonel F.K. Beck, Twenty third Alabama regiment. By his fall my division lost a chivalrous soldier and his native State one of her worthiest sons.

Upon our arrival in front of Columbia, my position in line was assigned from the right of the Mount Pleasant pike, the front of the division in line of battle. The investment was characterized by nothing of interest, as far as my division was concerned. A desultory skirmish fire was kept up most of the time. My losses here were few.

On the night of the 27th November, my scouts reported that there were indications that the enemy were evacuating Columbia. I immediately increased the number of scouts, and about an hour before day sent forward the Eighteenth and Third Tennessee regiments (consolidated), under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Butler. He found the reports of the scouts to be correct, and occupied the town without opposition. I then moved forward my division, except Cumming’s brigade (commanded on the campaign by Colonel E.P. Watkins, Fifty sixth Georgia), which, by General Lee’s order, was sent down the river to press those of the enemy who had taken that route, and endeavor to save the railroad bridge, which, however, had been fired before their arrival.

In the fort at Columbia we secured a large amount of howitzer and small arm ammunition and two siege howitzers. Colonel Butler had immediately upon gaining possession of the town sent a force to the ford of Duck river. The enemy’s skirmishers were found to be in large force on the opposite bank and the enemy in position behind works about three quarters of a mile from the river. He immediately moved down his command, and skirmished with them briskly. The Sixtieth North Carolina, coming up soon after, was sent further up the bank of the river to a point from which they obtained a flanking fire upon the enemy. This drove them back from the immediate bank of the river. Orders were soon after received to discontinue the skirmishing. On the night of that day, General Hood, with Cheatham’s and Steuart’s corps and Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, crossed Duck river some miles above Columbia, and pushed for the enemy’s rear, leaving General Lee, with Clayton’s and my division to occupy the enemy in front until he should have reached his position, then to force a crossing of the river and attack the enemy as he attempted to extricate himself.

The greater part of the next day was spent in preparations for this movement. The bank of the river was quite steep on the side held by the enemy. A pontoon boat, in charge of Captain Ramsay, engineer, was taken down the river under a galling fire, launched, and could there, under the cover of our artillery and skirmish fire, be used without much exposure in ferrying our troops. This was done with all practicable rapidity, the troops as they crossed forming under the cover of the steep bank to which I have alluded. About an hour before sunset I had succeeded in crossing three (3) regiments of Pettus’ brigade, Brigadier General Pettus in command. The Twentieth Alabama regiment (Colonel I.M. Dedman) of his brigade had previously been sent up the bank of the river to obtain a flanking fire upon the enemy, and the Thirtieth Alabama (Lieutenant Colonel F. R. Elliott) was retained on the Columbia side to cover the ford in case of any failure.

Everything being made ready, I directed General Pettus to advance, and his command dashed forward at the word, driving the enemy before them by a charge which elicited the warmest admiration of all who witnessed it. Their loss was slight; that of the enemy so considerable that to explain the affair, the commander of the enemy saw fit to attribute to an entire division an attack made by three (3) of its regiments. Having driven the enemy within their main line, General Pettus halted, selected a position to prevent the enemy from interrupting the laying of the pontoons, and was subsequently reinforced by the rest of his brigade and by Holtzclaw’s brigade of Clayton’s division. The pontoon bridge was then laid with all practicable expedition. During the night General Pettus reported that the enemy was retiring, and he following with his skirmishers. This was as anticipated, and orders had already been given by General Lee to have everything in readiness to move, coupled with the statement that General Hood had advised him that he was between the enemy and Nashville, near Spring Hill. At daybreak I put my division in motion, in rear of Clayton’s.

Upon arriving at Spring Hill, we were informed that from some cause, which has not been explained, the enemy had been suffered to pass unattacked along the road commanded by the troops which the Commanding General took with him. We were then ordered to push on to Franklin. My division was halted about dusk in three miles of that place, and took no part in the battle. During the night the division was put in position, preparatory to an assault, which it was announced was to be made by the entire army at daybreak.

The enemy, however, evacuated the town before the hour for the assault. We then advanced to within a few miles of Nashville, and threw up a line of works — my position being on the right and left of the Franklin pike. Several new lines were built, but my position with regard to the pike remained unchanged.

Until the opening of the battles around Nashville, nothing of interest transpired in my command, except the part taken by my skirmishers, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.B. Bibb, Twenty third Alabama, in a demonstration made by Lee’s corps. The enemy’s skirmishers were driven by a greatly inferior force from all of their entrenched positions. My skirmishers were handsomely handled, and did their work with a dash and gallantry which deserve praise. Just before this demonstration, Palmer’s brigade (consolidated from Brown’s and Reynold’s old brigades), was detached and ordered to report to Major General N.B. Forrest in front of Murfreesboro’. It remained so detached from the division until it reached Bear creak, on this side of Barton’s station.

On the 15th of December the battle in front of Nashville opened. Except some unimportant skirmishing, my division took no part in that day’s fight; although its position was frequently shifted, and the line greatly attenuated, to fill vacancies in the works caused by the withdrawal of the troops. On the next day the enemy advanced early in heavy force in front of the new line, which we had constructed late the previous night, my division extending its entire length, part of it in two and part in one thin rank, from a short distance to the left of the Franklin pike. The skirmishers of the right of Lee’s corps, Clayton’s and mine maintained their positions so well, though in small force, that in their subsequent accounts, the enemy have seen fit to magnify the affair with them into a desperate assault by two corps upon our first line, which was finally successful, but attended with heavy loss. Soon afterward their forces advanced to the assault, principally upon a part of General Clayton’s line and upon Pettus’ brigade of my division — exposing, in their assault upon Pettus, their flank to a fire from Cumming’s brigade. Their success the previous day had emboldened them, and they rushed forward with great spirit, only to be driven back with dreadful slaughter. Finding at last that they could make no impression upon our lines, they relinquished their attempts, and contented themselves with keeping up an incessant fire of small arms at long range, and an artillery fire which I have never seen surpassed for heaviness, continuance and accuracy. This state of things continued until evening — doing, however, but little damage, my men keeping closely in the trenches, and perfectly cool and confident.

Towards evening General Lee sent me information “that things were going badly on the left,” and that “it might be necessary to retire under cover of the approaching night.” I at once hurried off orders for the artillery horses — which had been removed some distance to the rear to protect them from the fire of the enemy’s artillery, under which they could not have lived half an hour — to be brought up. (It is proper to observe that about the middle of the day mist and rain arose, which entirely prevented my seeing anything that was going on beyond my own line.) The messengers had hardly gone for the horses before the break which, commencing some distance beyond the left of Lee’s corps, extended to my line. Seeing it, the men on my left commenced leaving the works; but, at the call of their officers, returned at once, and held the line until the enemy were in fifty steps of them on their flank and pouring a fire into them from the flank and rear.

When the true situation of affairs became apparent, and it was evident that the whole army, with the exception of my division and Clayton’s, had been broken and scattered, the order for their withdrawal was given — an effort being made to deploy skirmishers from my left brigade, at right angles to the works, to cover in some measure the movement. Amidst the indescribable confusion of other troops, and with the enemy pouring in their fire upon their flank and from the front (having rushed towards the break and then forward, when they perceived that the troops on my left had broken), it was impossible to withdraw the command in order, and it became considerably broken and confused. Many of them were unable to get out of the trenches in time and were captured. All this happened in as short a time as it has taken to describe it. The artillery horses of Rowan’s battery on the left of my line could not be brought up in time, and one of the guns of Cuput’s battery was lost by being driven at full speed against a tree and the carriage broken. The different brigade and regimental commanders had sent off their horses, there being no protection for them near the breastworks, and being thus unable to move about more rapidly than the men, were prevented from reforming their commands as quickly as could have been desired and extricating them from the throng of panic stricken stragglers from other commands who crowded the road. This was done at last, and the line of march taken up for Franklin. On the way I received orders from General Lee to leave Pettus’ brigade at Hollow Tree Gap, to assist in bringing up the rear, and to proceed with Cumming’s brigade and bivouac near the battle field at Franklin, leaving guards upon the road to stop the stragglers of the army.

The next morning, by General Lee’s order, I returned with Cumming’s brigade to Franklin, and was there joined by General Pettus with his brigade, which had that morning before reaching Franklin captured a stand of colors. Soon after crossing the Harpeth, Lieutenant General Lee was wounded. When about three miles from Franklin, General Lee moved off with the rest of the corps, and directed me to take command of the cavalry, commanded by Brigadier General Chalmers, which, with my division, was to constitute the rear guard.

The enemy did not press us heavily until we arrived near Johnson’s house, five or six miles north of Spring Hill. Here I formed my line, having about seven hundred (700) infantry, with the cavalry on my flanks. The enemy advanced rapidly upon me, attacking <shv3_166>me in front. I found it impossible to control the cavalry, and, with the exception of a small force on the left, for a short time, to get them into action. I may as well state that at this point, as soon as the enemy engaged us heavily, the cavalry retired in disorder, leaving my small command to their fate. The enemy, perceiving the shortness of my line, at once threw a force around my left flank, and opened fire upon it and its rear. This was a critical moment, and I felt great anxiety as to its effect upon my men, who, few in numbers, had just had the shameful example of the cavalry added to the terrible trial of the day before. I at once ordered Colonel Watkins to prepare to retire fighting by the flank, and General Pettus to move in line of battle to the rear, with a regiment thrown at right angles to his flank, thus forming three (3) sides of a square. Watkins drove the enemy in his front in confusion, moved at the order which was given on the instant of success by the flank, and charged those on his flank and drove them also.

I halted again in about half a mile, formed a line upon each side of the pike, Pettus on the right, Watkins on the left, each with a regiment formed on his flank perpendicularly to his line to the rear, and having made these dispositions moved again to the rear. The enemy soon enveloped us in front, flanks and rear, but my gallant men, under all their charges, never faltered, never suffered their formation to be broken for an instant, and thus we moved driving our way through them, fighting constantly until within a short distance of Spring Hill, where we found that Major General Clayton, hearing of our situation, had turned and moved back to our assistance. Here I halted for a time, and Holtzclaw’s brigade of Clayton’s division was formed upon Watkins’ left flank in the manner which I have described. While here the enemy made several attacks, and opened upon us with artillery, but were readily repulsed. This was some time after dark. We finally moved off, and after marching about a mile further, finding that the enemy had evidently become disheartened and abandoned his attacks, I placed the whole command again upon the pike and marched in the ordinary manner until I reached the bivouac of the remainder of the corps.

I desire here to record my acknowledgments to the officers and men of Holtzclaw’s brigade, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Jones, for the timely aid which they so gallantly afforded.

Lieutenant General Lee was pleased to acknowledge, in grateful and complimentary terms, the services of my division upon this occasion, and I make no vain boast when I, too, thank them for their conduct, and declare that never did a command in so perilous a position extricate itself by the force of more admirable coolness, determination and unflinching gallantry.

On that night I was directed by Lieutenant General Lee to assume command of his corps during his disability.
I am greatly indebted to my staff: Major John J. Reeve, Assistant Adjutant General; Surgeon H.M. Crupton, Medical Director; Major J.E. McEleath, Assistant Quartermaster; Major J.H.F. Mayo, C.S.; Major H.M. Mathews, Ordnance Officer; Captain G.D. Wise, Assistant Inspector General; Captain Charles Vidor, Assistant Quartermaster; Lieutenant H.T. Botts, Aid de Camp; Lieutenant G.A. Hayard, Aid de Camp; also Captain W.H. Sikes, Forty fifth Tennessee regiment, and Lieutenant W.E. McElwee, Twenty sixth Tennessee regiment, temporarily on duty at my headquarters, for their most efficient and valuable services, and for their untiring efforts to assist me during this arduous and trying campaign.

I have the honor to be,
very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

C. H. Stevenson,
Major General.

Major J. W. Ratchford,
Assistant Adjutant General, Lee’s Corps

Columbus, Mississippi, January 30th, 1865.

Colonel –

I have the honor to offer the following as my official report of the operations of my corps during the offensive movement commencing at Palmetto station, Georgia, September 29th, 1864. It is impracticable now, in consequence of the movement of troops and my temporary absence from the army, to obtain detailed reports from my division commanders.

As a corps commander, I regarded the morale of the army greatly impaired after the fall of Atlanta, and in fact before its fall the troops were not by any means in good spirits. It was my observation and belief that the majority of the officers and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks, that when orders were given for attack, and there was a probability of encountering works, they regarded it as recklessness in the extreme. Being impressed with these convictions, they did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always insures success. Whenever the enemy changed his position, temporary works could be improvised in less than two hours, and he could never be caught without them. In making these observations, it is due to many gallant officers and commands to state that there were noticeable exceptions, but the feeling was so general that anything like a general attack was paralyzed by it. The army having constantly yielded to the flank movements of the enemy, which he could make with but little difficulty, by reason of his vastly superior numbers, and having failed in the offensive movements prior to the fall of Atlanta, its efficiency for further retarding the progress of the enemy was much impaired; and, besides, the advantages in the topography of the country south of Atlanta were much more favorable to the enemy for the movements of his superior numbers than the rough and mountainous country already yielded to him. In view of these facts, it was my opinion that the army should take up the offensive, with the hope that favorable opportunities would be offered for striking the enemy successfully, thus insuring the efficiency of the army for future operations. Those opinions were freely expressed to the Commanding General.

My corps crossed the Chattahoochee river on September 29th, and on October 3d took position near Lost mountain, to cover the movement of Stewart’s corps, on the railroad, at Big Shanty and Altoona. On October 6th, I left my position near Lost mountain, marching via Dallas and Cedartown, crossing the Coosa river at Coosaville October 10th, and moved on Resaca, partially investing the place by four P.M. on October 12th. The surrender of the place was demanded in a written communication, which was in my possession, signed by General Hood. The commanding officer refused to surrender as he could have easily escaped from the forts with his forces and crossed the Oustenaula river. I did not deem it prudent to assault the works, which were strong and well manned, believing that our loss would have been severe. The main object of appearing before Resaca being accomplished, and finding that Sherman’s main army was moving from the direction of Rome and Adairsville towards Resaca, I withdrew from before the place to Snake Creek gap about midday on the 13th. The enemy made his appearance at the gap on the 14th in large force and on the 15th it was evident that his force amounted several corps. Several severe skirmishes took place on the 15th, in which Deas’ and Brantley’s brigades of Johnson’s division were principally engaged. This gap was held by my command till the balance of the army had passed through Matex’s gap, when I followed with the corps through the latter. The army moved to Gadsden, where my corps arrived on October 21st. At this point clothing was issued to the troops, and the army commenced its march towards Tennessee. My corps reached the vicinity of Leighten, in the Tennessee Valley, October 29th. Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were then in front of Decatur. On the night of the 29th I received orders to cross the Tennessee river at Florence, Alabama. By means of the pontoon boats two brigades of Johnson’s division were thrown across the river two and a half miles above south Florence, and Gibson s brigade of Clayton’s division was crossed at south Florence. The enemy occupied Florence with about 1,000 cavalry, and had a strong picket at the railroad bridge. The crossing at this point was handsomely executed and with much spirit by Gibson, under the direction of General Clayton, under cover of several batteries of artillery. The distance across the river was about one thousand yards. The troops landed, and, after forming, charged the enemy and drove him from Florence. The crossing was spirited, and reflected much credit on all engaged in it. Major General Edward Johnson experienced considerable difficulty in crossing his two brigades, because of the extreme difficulty of managing the boats in the shoals. He moved from the north bank of the river late in the evening with one brigade, Sharp’s Mississippi, and encountered the enemy on the Florence and Huntsville road about dark. A spirited affair took place, in which the enemy were defeated with a loss of about forty killed, wounded and prisoners. The enemy retreated during the night to Shoal creek, about nine miles distant. The remainder of Johnson’s and Clayton’s divisions were crossed on the night of the 30th and on the morning of the 31st.

Stevenson’s division was crossed on November 2d. My corps remained in Florence till November 20th, when the army commenced moving for Tennessee, my command leading the advance and marching in the direction of Columbia via Henryville and Mount Pleasant. I arrived in front of Columbia on the 26th, relieving Forest’s cavalry then in position there, which had followed the enemy from Pulaski.

The force of the enemy occupying Columbia was two corps. They confined themselves to the main works around the city, and their outposts and skirmishers were readily driven in. On the night of the 27th the enemy evacuated Columbia and crossed Duck river. Stevenson’s division of my corps entered the town before daylight. After crossing, the enemy took a strong position on the opposite side of the river and entrenched, his skirmishers occupying rifle pits 250 yards from the river. There was considerable skirmishing across the river during the day, and some artillery firing, resulting in nothing of importance.

On the morning of the 29th Johnson’s division of my corps was detached and ordered to report to the General Commanding. I was directed to occupy and engage the enemy near Columbia, while the other two corps and Johnson’s division would be crossed above and moved to the rear of the enemy in the direction of Spring Hill. The entire force of the enemy was in front of Columbia till about midday on the 29th, when one corps commenced moving off — the other remaining in position as long as they could be seen by us, or till dark. I had several batteries of artillery put in position, to drive the skirmishers of the enemy from the vicinity of the river bank, and made a display of pontoons — running several of them down to the river, under a heavy artillery and musketry fire. Having succeeded in putting a boat in the river, Pettus’ brigade of Stevenson’s division was thrown across, under the immediate direction of Major General Stevenson, and made a most gallant charge on the rifle pits of the enemy, driving a much superior force and capturing the pits. The bridge was at once laid down and the crossing commenced. During the affair around Columbia the gallant and accomplished soldier, Colonel R. F. Beckham, commanding the artillery regiment of my corps, was mortally wounded while industriously and fearlessly directing the artillery firing against the enemy. He was one of the truest and best officers in the service.

The enemy left my front about 2:30 A.M. on the morning of the 30th, and the pursuit was made as rapidly as was prudent in the night time. The advance of Clayton’s division arrived at Spring Hill about 9 A.M., when it was discovered that the enemy had made his escape, passing around that portion of the army in that vicinity. My corps, including Johnson’s division, followed immediately after Cheatham’s corps towards Franklin. I arrived near Franklin about 4 P.M. The Commanding General was just about attacking the enemy with Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps, and he directed me to place Johnson’s, and afterwards Clayton’s, division in position to support the attack. Johnson moved in rear of Cheatham’s corps. Finding that the battle was stubborn, General Hood directed me to move forward in person, to communicate with General Cheatham, and, if necessary, to put Johnson’s division in the fight. I met General Cheatham about dark, and was informed by him that assistance was needed at once. Johnson was immediately moved forward to the attack, but owing to the darkness and want of information as to the locality, his attack was not felt by the enemy till about one hour after dark. This division moved against the enemy’s breastworks under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, gallantly driving the enemy from portions of his line. The brigades of Sharp and Brantley (Mississippians), and of Deas (Alabamians), particularly, distinguished themselves.

Their dead were mostly in the trenches and in the works of the enemy, where they fell in a desperate hand to hand conflict. Sharp captured three stand of colors. Brantley was exposed to a severe enfilade fire. These noble brigades never faltered in this terrible night struggle. Brigadier General Manigault, commanding a brigade of Alabamians and South Carolinians, was severely wounded in this engagement, while gallantly leading his troops to the fight; and his two successors in command, Colonel Shaw was killed and Colonel Davis wounded. I have never seen greater evidences of gallantry than was displayed by this division, under command of that admirable and gallant soldier, Major General Ed. Johnson. The enemy fought gallantly and obstinately at Franklin, and the position he held was for infantry defence one of the best I had ever seen. The enemy evacuated Franklin hastily during the night of the 30th. My corps commenced the pursuit about 1 P.M. on December 1st, and arrived near Nashville about 2 P.M. December 2d. The enemy had occupied the works around the city. My command was the centre of the army in front of Nashville; Cheatham’s corps being on my right and Stewart’s on my left.

[Editor's note: Nashville battle content removed].
I have the honor to be, yours respectfully,

Stephen Dill Lee,
Lieutenant General.
Colonel A. P. Mason, A.A.G

General Hood reported the loss of the army of Tennessee at 4,500. The loss of Schofield’s army numbered 2,326 killed, wounded and missing. Of this number, 1,104 were captured by the Confederates, about 600 of them by Brown and Cleburne from the enemy’s line in advance of his intrenchments.

Gen. J. D. Cox says the Federal loss in killed was “trifling everywhere but near the center,” the point assailed by Cleburne and Brown. No report with list of casualties was ever made, and no data exist for the ascertainment of the actual losses of these two divisions, but it must have been 40 per cent in killed, wounded and missing. In Quarles’ Tennessee brigade of Stewart’s corps, the loss was just as great, and the death rate in Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps was out of the usual proportion. It was great enough to make Tennessee a land of mourning.

The attacks of the Confederates were repeated at intervals until dark, and on part of the line until 9 o’clock. At midnight the Federal forces were withdrawn and marched to Nashville.

After our dead comrades were buried and the wounded of both armies provided for, the army of Tennessee moved forward to the front of Nashville, where on the 2d of December a line of battle was formed and intrenchments provided. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division came up, and Ector’s brigade of Stewart’s corps rejoined the army, which was now 23,053 strong, opposed to an army under Gen. George H. Thomas of more than three times that number.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Brig.-Gen. John Adams, of Tennessee, was killed* after leading his command up to the enemy’s main line of works. Gen. Jacob D. Cox says of him:

“In one of the lulls between these attacks, when the smoke was so thick that one could see a very little way in front, the officers of the line discovered a mounted officer in front forming for another attack or rallying them after a repulse. Shots were fired and horse and rider both fell. The horse struggled to his feet and dashed for the breastworks, leaped upon it and fell dead astride it. The wounded officer was Gen. John Adams. He was brought in and soon died.”

Source: Confederate Military History

*Killed at Battle of Franklin; commanded brigade in Loring’s division, Stewart’s corps, Army of Tennessee, composed of the 6th, 14th, 15th, 20th, 23d and 43d Mississippi regiments.

John C. Carter was a native of Georgia, a citizen of Tennessee, where he was educated, entered the service as a lieutenant in the Thirty-eighth Tennessee, won honorable mention from his colonel at Shiloh, and further promotion and honor until he was made a brigadier-general. He early attracted the attention of his division general, upon whose recommendation his final advancement was made upon his merit. He had a wonderfu gentleness of manner, coupled with a dauntless courage. Every field officer of his brigade except Colonel Hurt was killed, wounded or captured on the enemy’s works.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

O. F. Strahl was born on the banks of the Muskingum, came to Tennessee in his youth, and was as thoroughly identified with the State as any one of her sons. He gave to the Fourth Tennessee its drill and discipline, and made it a noted regiment; and, succeeding A. P. Stewart in command of his brigade, added splendor to the reputation won for it by that accomplished soldier. When General Strahl entered upon the Tennessee campaign he was just recovering from a dangerous wound received at the battle of Atlanta on the 22d of July. He was a very accomplished tactician, and always handled his regiment and brigade with ease and skill.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Major-General Stanley (right), commanding the Fourth Federal corps, in his official report stated that:

“In view of the strong position we held, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield’s headquarters until the firing commenced.”

Major-General Cox, (bottom right) commanding the Twenty-third corps, and in active command of the Federal line of battle, undertakes to account for the attack made by General Hood thus:

“His exasperation at what he regarded as a hair’s breadth escape on our part from the toils in which he thought he had encompassed us at Spring Hill had probably clouded his judgment. He blamed some of his subordinates for the hesitation which he seems himself to have been responsible for, and now, in an excitement which led him astray, he determined to risk everything upon a desperate assault.”

The same eminent author, referring to the assault made by Cleburne and Brown on the Federal center, says:

“They were seen coming in splendid array. The sight was one to send a thrill through the heart, and those who saw it have never forgotten its martial magnificence.”

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Also read:

• Wikipedia article on Jacob D. Cox

Maj.-Gen. B. F. Cheatham.

“On the morning of the 4th of December,” says General Cheatham, “I went to the headquarters of General Hood, and referring to his note and the criticism that had evidently been made by some one, I said to him, ‘A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.’ General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship.”

At daylight Cheatham’s corps passed through the village of Spring Hill, and between 1 and 2 o’clock p.m. the army reached the vicinity of Franklin, and Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were put in positions. The enemy was heavily intrenched and was superior in numbers and equipment. On the morning of the battle, General Schofield, commanding the Federal army, had behind his works 23,734 infantry and artillery, and his cavalry numbered 5,500. Maj.-Gen. J. D. Cox, U. S. A., upon whose authority these figures are given, states in his history of the battle of Franklin that Hood delivered the assault on the Federal lines with “two or three hundred less than 24,000″ men, and gives Forrest’s strength at 9,000. Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown reported that on the morning of November 29, 1864, he had not exceeding 2,750 men in his division, the largest in Cheatham’s corps, and the three divisions did not exceed 6,000. Smith’s brigade of Cleburne’s division was not present. Stewart’s corps after Allatoona was less than 7,000, and with Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps, the assaulting column did not exceed 16,000 men. General Forrest stated in his official report that the entire cavalry force under his command was about 5,000.

Bate’s division was on the left, Brown’s in the center, Cleburne’s on the right. General Bate says his line “charged the works of the enemy. My right got to the works (the second line) and remained there until morning;’the left was driven back. The enemy’s works were strong and defiant, constructed on a slight elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred yards. The works to the left of Carter’s creek turnpike were not strong, and with a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until next day.” Bate’s division sustained a loss of 47 killed and 253 wounded. Capt. Todd Carter (right), on staff duty with Smith’s Tennessee brigade, fell mortally wounded near the enemy’s works and almost at the door of his father’s house.

No more magnificent spectacle was ever witnessed than the advance of the two divisions commanded by Cleburne and Brown; no two divisions of the army were ever led with greater skill and gallantry; no generals of division were ever supported with better ability by brigade, regimental and company officers. The troops were veterans who had never failed to respond to orders, although discouraged by recent and frequent disasters; and fully alive to the desperation of the assault about to be made, they advanced with noble courage. Before troops of equal numbers in the open field they would have been irresistible, but to attack intrenched troops, superior in numbers, advancing over an open plain without cover, was a disregard of the rules of war, a waste of precious lives, and a wrecking of an army once the pride and hope of the Southwest.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

General Forrest reported that after the arrival of Cleburne’s division at Spring Hill,

“I ordered Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson’s Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald’s, four miles from Spring Hill, at 11 o’clock, just as the front of the enemy’s column had passed. This attack was a complete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier-General Jackson had possession of the pike and fought the enemy until daylight, but receiving no support he was compelled to retire.”

Two small brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Ross, constituted Jackson’s division. If an adequate force had been sent forward to take advantage of the panic and confusion created by Jackson’s attack, a second golden opportunity would not have been lost.

Major-General Bate, referring to an interview with General Hood between the hours of 10 and 12 of the night of the 29th of November, at which General Bate mentioned a conflict in the orders of the general commanding and the corps commander touching the movement of his division, relates that General Hood said:

“It makes no difference now, or it is all right, anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender without a fight.”

He further said in a congratulatory manner, “We can sleep quietly to-night.”

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Memphis, Tenn.,
May 20, 1877.

Maj.-Gen. John C. Brown, commanding Cheatham’s division, gave the following account of the same affair:

My division comprised four brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Gen. S. R. Gist, of South Carolina, Gens. O. F. Strahl, O. W. Gordon and John C. Carter, of Tennessee. The whole command on the morning of November 29, 1864, when I left my bivouac on the Mooresville turnpike in front of Columbia, Tenn., numbered not exceeding 2,750 effective men. Gist’s brigade was the largest and Strahl’s was next in numerical strength, those of Gordon and Carter being about equal in the number of effective men. We started on the march about sunrise, and after traversing cedar brakes and pathless woods, crossed Duck river by a pontoon previously laid, about four miles above Columbia, at or near what was known as Davis’ ferry or Davis’ ford. Conforming to the daily alternations, my division was the rear of your (Cheatham’s) corps. After crossing Duck river, as I now recollect, at or near Bear creek, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your corps, in its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle if attacked on the flank. Accordingly, my division was ordered to form the supporting column, and for that purpose to leave the road by which the main body was moving, and so conform its movements to that of the other two divisions (Cleburne’s and Bate’s), that in coming into action to meet an attack on our left flank, it would occupy a place in rear of and about 400 yards distant from the front line of battle. The march thence to Rutherford’s creek was made pursuant to these orders, and the whole distance thus traversed (five or six miles) was through fields and woods and over rough ground, adding greatly to the fatigues of the day. About the commencement of this movement, or soon afterward, by the orders of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist’s and about one-half of Strahl’s brigade were detached for picket duty, to be relieved by the orders of the commanding general, thus leaving me with about one-half of my division.

When near Rutherford’s creek, learning that a crossing was not practicable east of the road, I changed the direction of the march to the left into the road and found Bate’s division preparing to cross the stream. After reaching the north bank of the stream, I was ordered to pursue the road leading in the direction of the Caldwell place, while Cleburne’s and Bate’s divisions moved at an angle to the left; but before reaching the Dr. Caldwell house, I was ordered to change the direction of my column to the left, and we reached the “Lewisburg,” or “Rally Hill” pike, near the toll-gate, a distance of one and a half mile from Spring Hill. This was within an hour or an hour and a half of sunset. I could distinctly see the enemy in force, both infantry and artillery, at Spring Hill, but did not, and perhaps could not at that point, see either troops or wagons, moving on the Columbia pike. Forrest’s cavalry were on higher ground northeast of my position. I was ordered to form line of battle and “take” Spring Hill. Gist’s brigade and the detachment from Strahl had not reported. I formed my line as speedily as worn troops could move, and after throwing forward a skirmish line, advanced 400 or 500 yards, when I discovered a line of the enemy thrown out of Spring Hill, across and threatening my right flank, and I then discovered for the first time that General Forrest’s cavalry, which I had been assured would protect my right, had been ordered to another part of the field, leaving me without any protection on my right flank or support in rear. I had neither artillery nor cavalry, and was left in a position where I must meet with inevitable disaster if I advanced on Spring Hill. A hasty consultation with my brigade commanders resulted in a determination to suspend the advance and confer with the corps commander. I need not remind you that in a very few minutes you were upon the field and fully approved of what had been done, as did also General Hood a little later, when he directed that the attack should be delayed until the arrival of Generals Stewart and Gist, and in the meanwhile, that the whole command should be held under orders to advance at a moment’s notice. General Gist’s brigade reported a little after nightfall and was immediately placed in position on my right. General Stewart’s corps came up later and went into bivouac on the stream in rear of my right, where it remained until the following morning. I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position. After daylight on the morning of the 30th I took up the line of march for Franklin, the enemy in the meantime having preceded us under circumstances of which you are fully advised.

On the march to Franklin, General Cleburne, with whom I had long enjoyed very close personal relations, sent a message to the head of my column requesting an interview. Allowing my column to pass on, I awaited his arrival. When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feeling that he had heard that the commanding general was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said, “No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,” and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, as soon as we were away from the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the com-mander-in-chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command (Bate’s division) occupying a position on his left, and concluded by saying that of course the responsibility rests with the commander-in-chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the night of the movement of the enemy. The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders from yourself or the commanding general. As he left he said, “We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment,” but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Also see:

• Wikipedia article on John C. Brown

The following communication, written by Governor (afterward Senator) Harris of Tennessee, then acting as aide to General Hood, is a valuable contribution to the history of this campaign. It is copied from Drake’s “Annals of the Army of Tennessee,” for May, 1877. A copy was furnished to General Hood:

Gov. James D. Porter:

Dear Sir:

In answer to yours of the 12th instant, I have to say that on the night that the army of Tennessee, under command of Gen. J. B. Hood, halted at Spring Hill on its march from Columbia to Nashville, General Hood, his adjutant-general, Major Mason, and myself occupied the same room at the residence of Captain Thompson, near the village. Late at night we were aroused by a private soldier, who reported to General Hood that on reaching the camp near Spring Hill he found himself within the Federal lines; that the troops were in great confusion, a part of them were marching in the direction of Franklin, others had turned toward Columbia, and that the road was blocked with baggage-wagons and gun-carriages, rendering it impossible to move in order in either direction. Upon the receipt of this report, General Hood directed Major Mason to order General Cheatham to move down on the road immediately and attack the enemy. General Hood and myself remained in bed. I went to sleep, and I supposed that General Hood did the same. At daylight on the following morning we learned that the Federal army had left Spring Hill and was being concentrated at Franklin.

On the march to Franklin, General Hood spoke to me, in the presence of Major Mason, of the failure of General Cheatham to make the night attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for his disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked that “General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter last night. I did not send him the order.” I asked if he had communicated the fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that it is due to General Cheatham that this explanation should be made. Thereupon Major Mason joined General Hood and gave him the information. Afterward General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me to inform him that he held him blameless for the failure at Spring Hill. And, on the day following the battle of Franklin, I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham, assuring him that he did not censure or charge him with the failure to make the attack.

Very respectfully,

ISHAM G. HARRIS

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

Also see:

• Isham G. Harris article in Wikipedia
• The Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture online edition, article on Isha, Green Harris

Major-General Cheatham gave the following account of the affair at Spring Hill:

In pursuance of orders from army headquarters, my command crossed Duck river on the morning of the 29th of November, 1864, the division of Major-General Cleburne in advance, followed by that of Major-General Bate, the division of Major-General Brown in the rear. The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the road would allow and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o’clock p.m., when I arrived at Rutherford’s creek, two and one-half miles from Spring Hill. At this point General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get Cleburne across the creek and send him forward toward Spring Hill, with instructions to communicate with General Forrest, who was near the village, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist General Bate in crossing his division, and then go forward and put Bate’s command in to support Cleburne, and that he would push Brown forward to join me.

As soon as the division of General Bate had crossed the creek I rode forward, and at a point on the road, about one and a half mile from Spring Hill, I saw the left of Cleburne’s command just disappearing over the hill to the left of the road. Halting there, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of Cleburne’s left, and ordered him forward to the support of Cleburne. Shortly after Bate’s division had disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward Cleburne’s right and just then General Brown’s division had come up. I thereupon ordered Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which Cleburne and Bate had crossed, and form line of battle and attack to the right of Cleburne. The division of General Brown was in motion to execute this order when I received a message from Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and reform his division with a change of front.

It so happened that the direction of Cleburne’s advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy’s line. When his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from Rutherford’s creek, neither the village of Spring Hill nor the turnpike could be seen. Instead of advancing directly upon Spring Hill, his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward Columbia, instead of northwest upon the enemy’s lines, south and east of the village. A reference to the map will show Cleburne’s line of advance. General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred.

Meanwhile General Bate, whom I had placed in position on the left of Cleburne’s line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of N. F. Cheairs, one and a half mile south of Spring Hill.

After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy’s line extended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join Cleburne’s left. Going to the right of my line I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had reformed his division. I then gave orders to Brown and Cleburne that as soon as they could connect their lines they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart’s column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike. I furthermore said to them that I would go myself and see that General Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.

During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over 100 yards apart. After Cleburne’s repulse I had been along my line and had seen that Brown’s right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to Generals Cleburne and Brown.

When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart’s column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.

On reaching the road where General Hood’s field quarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson’s house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Rutherford’s creek. I found General Stewart and General Hood. The commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.

I was never more astonished than when General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight. The road was still open–orders to remain quiet until morning–and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to Franklin.

Source: Confederate Military History Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

On the 21st of November General Hood began his march to Nashville; on the 29th crossed Duck river three miles above Columbia, and then, with Cheatham’s and Stewart’s corps and a division of Lee’s corps, marched to Spring Hill.

Cheatham was in front, and in his official report, dated December 11, 1864, General Hood stated that

“Major-General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the enemy vigorously and get possession of this pike [the road to Franklin], and although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated.”

Again, in his history of the campaign (”Advance and Retreat,” pp. 285,286) it is related:

“General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place his corps across the pike north of Spring Hill. By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and turning to Cheatham I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, ‘General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of the pike?’”

Lieutenant-General Stewart, referring to this statement in a published letter, says that “no such exclamation by Hood to Cheatham could have been made in my presence.”

Source: Confederate Military History, Volume 8:
Tennessee Chapter X

“O, that I were free! God save me, I will run away. Get caught or get clear. I had as well be killed running as die standing.”

- Escaped slave

Source: Eyewitnesses to the Civil War, National Geographic (p. 44)

“I was never sold. My mama was sold only once, but she was hired out many times. Yes’m when a slave was allotted, somebody made a down payment and gave a mortgage for the rest. A chattel mortgage. . . .”

“Allotments made a lot of grief for the slaves,” Aunt Sally asserted. “We left my papa in Kentucky, ’cause he was allotted to another man. My papa never knew where my mama went, an’ my mama never knew where papa went.” Aunt Sally paused a moment, then went on bitterly. “They never wanted mama to know, ’cause they knowed she would never marry so long she knew where he was. Our master wanted her to marry again and raise more children to be slaves. They never wanted mama to know where papa was, an’ she never did,” sighed Aunt Sally.

- Sarah Frances Shaw Graves, Age 87

Skidmore Nodaway County, Missouri

Born in Slavery: Slave narratives from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1938

“In most of us colored folks was the great desire to [be] able to read and write. We took advantage of every opportunity to educate ourselves. The greater part of the plantation owners were very harsh if we were caught trying to learn or write. It was the law that if a white man was caught trying to educate a negro slave, he was liable to prosecution entailing a fine of fifty dollars and a jail sentence. We were never allowed to go to town and it was not until after I ran away that I knew that they sold anything but slaves, tobacco, and wiskey. Our ignorance was the greatest hold the South had on us. We knew we could run away, but what then? An offender guilty of this crime was subjected to very harsh punishment.”

- John W. Fields, LaFayette, Indiana, Age 89

Born in Slavery: Slave narratives from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1938

“I appear this evening as a thief and a robber. I stole this head, these limbs, this body from my master, and ran off with them.”

- Frederick Douglas, an escaped slave and ardent abolitionist

“Frederick Douglass (February 14, 1818 – February 20, 1895) was an American abolitionist, editor, orator, author, statesman and reformer. Called “The Sage of Anacostia” and “The Lion of Anacostia,” Douglass was one of the most prominent figures of African American history during his time, and one of the most influential lecturers and authors in American history” - Wikipedia

“I think we must get rid of slavery, or we must get rid of freedom.”

- Ralph Waldo Emerson

“Ralph Waldo Emerson was born in Boston to the Rev. William Emerson, a Unitarian minister in a famous line of ministers. He gradually drifted from the doctrines of his peers, then formulated and first expressed the philosophy of “Ralph Waldo Emerson was born in Boston to the Rev. William Emerson, a UnitarianTranscendentalism in his essay Nature (1837).” - Wikipedia

Walt Whitman (1819-1892)

With its cloud of skirmishers in advance,
With now the sound of a single shot snapping like a whip,
and now an irregular volley,
The swarming ranks press on and on, the dense brigades press on,
Gliterring dimly, toiling under the sun — the dust-cover’d men,
In columns rise and fall to the undulations of the ground,
With artillery interspers’d — the wheels rumble, the horses sweat,

As the army corps advances.

General Burnside’s Army Occupying Cumberland Gap, October 10, 1863, Harper’s Weekly

A Poem: Composed in 1890 by A. M. Mettetal

A prisoner lies in the Florence cell
With languid thoughts of home
Of parents dear, of friends beloved
From whom he sought to roam.
He heard his country’s wild alarms
At traitrous hands upraised
To rend the banner, that our sires
With blood and sufferings raised.

The patriotic fires that glowed
Within his manly breast
Roused stern ambitions voice for fame
Sought in the fair lands oppressed.
Decked in a suit of deepest blue
And soldier’s knapsack bound
He bade his home and friends adieu
For deeds of glory crowned.

At Fredericksburg the rebel hosts
Were met in strong attire
There many of our brave boys fell
Neath Secessions galling fire
At Fitz Hugh’s landing we will find
our bravest boys in blue
At Gettysburg they fought, they bled
Still to their country true

On many a battle field they fought
On fair Virginia’s plains
And many of our twenty fourth
Were numbered with the slain.
At the battle of the Wilderness
The fate of one is told
The ‘dashing sergeant’ here was missed
Yet dear the prize was sold

To southern dungeons he’s reduced
To pine away in grief
While friends at home who know his fate
Can send him no relief
For long - long months he’s thus confined
With naught his heart to cheer
Though far away, are parents dear
From whom he longs to hear.

At length a message from the north
Proclaimed the captive free
Proclaimed him free to seek the home
And friends he longed to see.
Alas! poor Emile! tragic fate
Which we must call thine own
Has taken from thy parents dear
A worthy, noble son.

On board the ‘General Lyon’ bound
To fair Potomac’s shore
He little thought that he should see
His native land no more
Yes! there upon the burning deck
Me thinks I see him stand
With features turned to catch a glimpse
Of his dear native land.

Alas! the billows madly toss
Hope dies within his breast
Now conscious that he soon must lie
Beneath the ocean’s crest
The angry waves roll o’er the wreck
At midnights awful gloom
And he’s left struggling with the tide
Against a frightful doom

But all in vain, exhausted now
He sinks beneath the wave
That rolls above that sinking form
To shroud the soldier’s grave
Still do I hear those accents mild
Oh father! mother! hear thy child
He sinks! he dies! he’s gone

No little mound of earth is left
On which to strew my flowers
No marble slab by which to kneel
Mid Elmwoods shady bowers
There’s but one solitary rock
On Carolina’s shore
Cape Hatteras on the Atlantic side
Mid billows deafening roar.

Yes! there he sleeps our darling boy
Who fought our flag to save
But why these tears since now he fills
A martyred patriots grave.
A father’s locks are turning gray
A mother’s voice is dumb.
The sisters smiles have flown away
While I bedeck his tomb.

O! brave defender of our rights
Renew affections chain
The memory of one blighted flower
Can make it strong again
O! Emile we can never forget
The laurels thou hast won
Has made thee follower of our
Brave Gallant Washington.

Composed by A. M. Mettetal

This very beautiful poem laments a mother’s tragic loss. It is an excellent example of late-Victorian memorial poetry.The poem was composed in 1890 by: Angelique Martine Mettetal

Angelique was born 10-23-1816 and died 4-27-1911.
She is buried in Redford Cemetery, Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan

Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham wrote of the demeanor of Hood’s troops in “Confederate Veteran” magazine in April, 1893,

“…the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements. The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville.”

“The next (Nov 30) morning, as we marched in quick time toward Franklin, we were confirmed in our impressions of federal alarm. I counted on the way thirty-four wagons that had been abandoned on the smooth turnpike. In some instances whole teams of mules had been killed to prevent their capture.”

Arriving at Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, at about 2:00 P.M., Hood observed the situation. Sergeant Major S. A. Cunningham, standing near to Hood on the hill as Hood contemplated the attack, recalled,

“The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville…but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through.”

Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers,

“In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center — involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains — only fordable by infantry at one or two places — and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds — a vastly superior force — in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation.”

Hood pondered thet critical dilemma that Nashville lay unprotected, and with only three hours of daylight remaining, decided to order an immediate frontal assault. As Cunningham later wrote,

“While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He (Hood) rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge.

After the fall of Atlanta in September 1864, Army of Tennessee commander General John Bell Hood, who had replaced Johnston in July, moved his army to the west and south of Atlanta, camping near the town of Palmetto. While visiting the army there on Sept. 26, Jefferson Davis exhorted the Tennessee troops.

“Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing Tennessee soil.”

Source:  web site